<center> <br /><a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/848243350993895424">Source Tweet</a></center> **Elon is a legend** - and having him casually mention chemtrails to his audience (even as a joke) is great for spreading awareness :) <center>**`In c<center> <br /><a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/848243350993895424">Source Tweet</a></center> **Elon is a legend** - and having him casually mention chemtrails to his audience (even as a joke) is great for spreading awareness :) <center>**`In case you missed this earlier:`**</center> <center><a href="https://steemit.com/geoengineering/@ausbitbank/harvard-launches-world-s-biggest-solar-geoengineering-study"><br />Harvard launches world's biggest solar geoengineering study</a></center> <center><a href="https://steemit.com/@ausbitbank"><img src="https://img1.steemit.com/0x0/https://www.steemimg.com/images/2016/09/21/ausbitbank4275c.png"></a><br /><strong>Lets connect !</strong><br /><a href="https://steemit.com/@ausbitbank">steemit</a> / <a href="https://twitter.com/ausbitbank">twitter</a> / <a href="http://gab.ai/ausbitbank">gab.ai</a> / <a href="https://keybase.io/ausbitbank">keybase</a><br /><strong>I also made :</strong><br /><a href="https://steemviz.com">steemviz</a> / <a href="https://steemvids.com">steemvids</a> / <a href="https://steemcap.com">steemcap</a> / <a href="https://steemit.com/@steemleak">steemleak</a> / <a href="https://steemviz.com/promo">promo</a></center>ase you missed this earlier:`**</center> <center><a href="https://steemit.com/geoengineering/@ausbitbank/harvard-launches-world-s-biggest-solar-geoengineering-study"><br />Harvard launches world's biggest solar geoengineering study</a></center> <center><a href="https://steemit.com/@ausbitbank"><img src="https://img1.steemit.com/0x0/https://www.steemimg.com/images/2016/09/21/ausbitbank4275c.png"></a><br /><strong>Lets connect !</strong><br /><a href="https://steemit.com/@ausbitbank">steemit</a> / <a href="https://twitter.com/ausbitbank">twitter</a> / <a href="http://gab.ai/ausbitbank">gab.ai</a> / <a href="https://keybase.io/ausbitbank">keybase</a><br /><strong>I also made :</strong><br /><a href="https://steemviz.com">steemviz</a> / <a href="https://steemvids.com">steemvids</a> / <a href="https://steemcap.com">steemcap</a> / <a href="https://steemit.com/@steemleak">steemleak</a> / <a href="https://steemviz.com/promo">promo</a></center>
kenangan yang tak ternilai terima kasih teman
# <center>https://res.cloudinary.com/hpiynhbhq/image/upload/v1517232314/oybiaksxelvgg8bnrr29.jpg</center> Menurut cerita rakyat yang berkembang di masyarakat Gayo, Tari Guel pertama kali ditarikan oleh Sangeda, putra Raja Linge XIII. Cerita ini berawal dari mimpi Sangeda, yang dalam mimpi tersebut dia bertemu dengan saudaranya yang telah meninggal yaitu Bener Meria. Bener Meria memberikan petunjuk untuk mendapatkan gajah putih agar dapat dipersembahkan kepada Sultan Aceh pada saat itu, karena puteri Sultan sangat berhasrat untuk memiliki gajah putih tersebut. Untuk mendapatkan gajah putih itu, Sangeda dan beberapa penduduk melakukan doa, tirakat dan kenduri di tepi sebuah danau dekat makam Bener Meria. Setelah itu dilanjutkan acara menari dengan diiringi lagu dan musik tradisional. Dalam tarian tersebut Sangeda menari sesuai dengan apa yang ditunjukan oleh Bener Meria. Sambil menyanyikan lagu yang sangat sedih, Sangeda menari mengikuti irama musik dan menari dengan gerakan seperti mengepakan sayap, berputar dan meliuk-liuk mengintari makam saudaranya. # <center>https://res.cloudinary.com/hpiynhbhq/image/upload/v1517232373/j7hdsiula3bbkho7ouhg.jpg</center> Penduduk yang menyaksikan pun ikut menari sampai terbawa suasana. Tiba-tiba mereka dikejutkan dengan seekor gajah berwarna putih mendekati prosesi tersebut. Sangeda pun mendekati gajah itu dan melakukan apa yang ditunjukan Bener Meria untuk menjinakannya. Setelah itu Sangeda membawa gajah putih tersebut ke Kerajaan Aceh dan menyerahkannya kepada Sultan. <center>https://res.cloudinary.com/hpiynhbhq/image/upload/v1517232464/wmgvteshg83dz0s3pdyc.jpg</center> Dari situlah Tari Guel ini tercipta. Walaupun kebenarannya belum bisa dibuktikan secara ilmiah, namun masyarakat Gayo percaya akan kebenaran cerita tersebut. Bahkan cerita rakyat dan Tari Guel ini telah diwariskan secara turun-temurun oleh masyarakat Gayo sejak zaman dahulu dan terus berkembang hingga sekarang. <center>Follow Me @Safrizal91</center> <center>Salam Steemit Aceh, Indonesia</center>
"Gangnam Style" (Korean: 강남스타일, IPA: [kaŋ.nam sɯ.tʰa.il]) is the 18th K-pop single by the South Korean musician Psy. The song was released on July 15, 2012, as the lead single of his sixth studio album Psy 6 (Six Rules), Part 1, and debuted at number one on South Korea's Gaon Chart. On December 21, 2012, "Gangnam Style" became the first YouTube video to reach one billion and two billion views.[7] The song's music video has been viewed over 3 billion times on YouTube,[8] and was the most viewed video on YouTube from November 24, 2012, when it surpassed the music video for "Baby" by Justin Bieber featuring Ludacris,[9] to July 10, 2017, when it was surpassed by the music video for "See You Again" by Wiz Khalifa featuring Charlie Puth.[10] The phrase "Gangnam Style" is a Korean neologism that refers to a lifestyle associated with the Gangnam District of Seoul. The song and its accompanying music video went viral in August 2012 and have influenced popular culture worldwide since then. "Gangnam Style" received mixed to positive reviews, with praise going to its catchy beat and Psy's amusing dance moves (which themselves have become a phenomenon) in the music video and during live performances in various locations around the world. In September 2012, "Gangnam Style" was recognized by Guinness World Records as the most "liked" video on YouTube. It subsequently won Best Video at the MTV Europe Music Awards held later that year. It became a source of parodies and reaction videos by many different individuals, groups and organizations. <iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wcLNteez3c4?rel=0" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen></iframe> By the end of 2012, the song had topped the music charts of more than 30 countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. As the song continued to rapidly gain popularity and ubiquity, its signature dance moves were attempted by many notable political leaders such as the British Prime Minister David Cameron, U.S. President Barack Obama, and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who hailed it as a "force for world peace".[11] On May 7, 2013, at a bilateral meeting with South Korea's President Park Geun-hye at the White House, U.S. President Barack Obama cited the success of "Gangnam Style" as an example of how people around the world are being "swept up" by the Korean Wave of culture.[12]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtEs3BetRew The Storm is here. Credico and Christine Assange came out today with some good news for people. BE A WIKILEAKS WARRIOR NOT A WIKILEAKS WORRIER Basically that means to stop talking what the Shills and troll say about wikileaks to heart. The dude has been stuck in an embassy for 7 years and nothing has happened to him. You need to know that it's going to be tough but it's always about exposing corruption on all levels. That's what's happening and whenever the government tries to run a social media operation they fail bigtime. They just don't have the same class as guys like me. With all the tests and exams they still can't figure out the heart of a situation and see the truth in matters. Government is not over people, or outside of the rules we follow. Truth is hard and cicada said something on this.  You are delivering a message that has been needed. If a soldier give his life to an oil war, he is awarded a piece of metal he can never wear. If a citizen fights the Deep State, he is awarded imprisonment in a small metal cage. There is something greater than seeking truth, recognising lies, truth is everywhere. The truth lies in the shadow away from those that blaze in the beastly light. The truth is beginning to emerge. Be a fighter and work with the cause. Don't be like those people that worry and do nothing. I donated to WIkileaks.  How about you? Wanna Get to the big leagues? 3301 Intel Group https://discord.gg/WDjbx8X
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pXxfYC-2XvI Merry Christmas to all in the night! I wanted to make sure I had a record of my donation of a Kittie to Wikileaks. Happy Holidays Mr. Assange and may your kitties and leaks be fruitful. 13 is the number that makes a bakers dozen and what that weird christmas song is all about. Tell embassy Cat he's good in my book! https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/363042 Much love to all Official WikiLeaks CryptoKitties https://wikileaks.shop/pages/cryptokitties Wikileaks Cryptokittie page https://www.cryptokitties.co/profile/0x49e290c0786c320e04d48f4f0b8a95432701a96e Block transaction https://etherscan.io/tx/0x99fb2a30fbf437f1294e14e49cc794bec60919784b99400db14c007f536b8b3c My Cryptokitties Address https://www.cryptokitties.co/profile/0x940c4bc1399d6e81cd8c1c779ddcab77299ad106
**Just when you thought we had hit peak CryptoKitty mania** - *this happens* <center><h2><a href="https://wikileaks.shop/pages/cryptokitties">Official WikiLeaks CryptoKitties</a></h2></center> > Today, 21 December 2017, WikiLeaks announces the arrival of its first purebred WikiLeaks CryptoKitties. Parents <a href="https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/301923">Mr. WikiLeaks</a> and <a href="https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/363461">Mrs. WikiLeaks’</a> unique offspring have started to explore the blockchain. WikiLeaks CryptoKitties go on sale today. These are the parents, two Generation 0 kitties called Mr and Mrs Wikileaks : <div class="pull-left"> <a href="https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/301923"></a> </div> <div class="pull-right"> <a href="https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/363461"></a> </div> <hr> WikiLeaks is giving away two first gen kitties, <a href="https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/366883">Trump’s Tender Tabby</a> and <a href="https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/367756">Clinton Console Kitty</a> to President Trump and Secretary Clinton. <div class="pull-left"> <a href="https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/366883"></a> </div> <div class="pull-right"> <a href="https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/367756"></a> </div> <hr > Wikileaks will be auctioning off their <a href="https://wikileaks.shop/pages/cryptokitties"> kitty offspring</a> to help fund their operations . With crypto-mania beginning to hit the mainstream hard, and some previous kitties selling for **as much as 100k each** - this could be a great moneymaker for Wikileaks going forwards. <center>**See the <a href="https://wikileaks.shop/pages/cryptokitties">Wikileaks Shop</a> for more info**</center> **PS:** *I wish they would answer their messages and take the @julianassange account keys - it's worth over $800 already!* <center><a href="https://discord.gg/Fz3pNZh"><img src="https://steemitimages.com/DQmRSmRyg4MdRdiKsWTMbfyiAG673K1yP65MoUTbCXGp9Xi/PAL-FOOTER.gif"></a><br /><sup>**Are you looking for a community to help guide you through your Steemy adventure ? <a href="https://discord.gg/Fz3pNZh">Come join us in the PAL discord server!</a>**</sup><br /><img src="https://steemitimages.com/DQmW22ms5AVoVaK2DdL4fWJ7fQ48sqWnfhHEkZokJfL2KQN/ausbitbankteamaustraliabanner.png"><br /><sup>*#teamaustralia banner thanks to @bearone*<br />**Are you an Aussie ? Come introduce yourself in the #teamaustralia <a href="https://discord.gg/unwacM5">chat room</a>!**</sup><br /></center> <center>**Please, consider <a href="https://steemit.com/~witnesses">Voting for my witness here</a> !**</center>
Short depressing post. I just want to say <strong>@steemleak is temporarily suspending all donations</strong> to wikileaks until I see <strong>convincing proof that Julian Assange is alive</strong> . Julian has been a personal hero of mine for a long time, and I can't emotionally deal with going over all of the evidence that's led me to make this decision right now. <center><em>I hope I'm wrong :'(</em></center> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/UzTkR0s.jpg"><br />[ <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/magazine/article4537648.ece#tab-4">Image Credit</a> ]</center> <strong>Edit:</strong> Wikileaks now polling for how they should show proof-of-life , lets hope I was just being paranoid - https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/790406530738913285 <center><strong>~ @ausbitbank ~</strong></center>
View this post on Hive: [Help Wanted: Looking for volunteers and ideas for @steemleak [Support wikileaks on steemit]](https://peakd.com/@ausbitbank/help-wanted-looking-for-volunteers-and-ideas-for-steemleak-support-wikileaks-on-steemit) *** Neither Steem, Steemit or Steemit INC can be trusted. Research the #SteemHostileTakeover , and come join everyone else on #Hive .
<center><a href="http://imgur.com/0zDEkBk.png"><img src="http://imgur.com/0zDEkBk.png"><br /> [See full size steemcloud]</a></center> <strong>Account balance at 8:30pm AEST 23/08/2016</strong> <strong>Steem</strong> `298.038` <strong>Steem Power</strong> `651.113` <strong>Steem Dollars</strong> `44.270` <center><h3>Donation #3 Triggered!</h3></center> **@changelly tx** `5028532DA1EF` **Steem** <a href="https://steemd.com/tx/5d91befda06b9e931b4838116a14ac09f19b31ac">sent</a> `298.038` , **Bitcoin** <a href="https://blockchain.info/tx/d2be0169c5b5fccfd853a2391c6e3fc2e68a9efcbbecc842ecd98a41c58f85a0">donated</a> `0.13714278` **@changelly tx** `5965D1008F01` **SBD** <a href="https://steemd.com/tx/fd7f0ed928dd896f7ffc69e4719f0b6d13dcad0a">Sent</a> `44.27` **Bitcoin** <a href="https://blockchain.info/tx/ed3db549648e0c7983a4d47c3716222a6ae1730307151ca3e19f99477ba4a033">donated</a> `0.06553419` **Bitcoin donated this time** : `0.20267697` **Current fiat value of this donation** `128.4 USD` **Bitcoin donated total** : `0.96757697` **Current fiat value of total donations** `613 USD` **9 posts published since last report:** - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-publication-the-podesta-emails-highlights-reel-1">Wikileaks Publication - The Podesta Emails [Highlights Reel 1]</a> - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-publication-the-podesta-emails-intro-by-julian-assange">Wikileaks Publication - The Podesta Emails [Intro by Julian Assange]</a> - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-org-press-conference-is-live-now-alternative-coverage-by-right-side-broadcasting">Wikileaks.org press conference is LIVE NOW [Alternative coverage by Right Side Broadcast</a> - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-publication-tisa-core-text-analysis">Wikileaks Publication 🌏 TiSA Core Text Analysis</a> - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-publication-tisa-core-text-draft">Wikileaks Publication 🌏 TiSA Core Text draft</a> - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-weekly-wrap-for-september-1-9th">🌏 Wikileaks Weekly Wrap for September 1-9th 🌏</a> <em>(archived)</em> - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/response-to-new-york-times-article-on-wikileaks">✍ Response to New York Times article on WikiLeaks ✍</a> <em>(archived)</em> - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-weekly-wrap-for-august-23-30th">🌏 Wikileaks Weekly Wrap for August 23-30th 🌏</a> <em>(archived)</em> - <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/steemleak-donation-report-2-23-8-2016">SteemLeak - Donation Report 2 (23/8/2016)</a> <em>(archived)</em> <center><img src="https://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png"><br /><em>As always - all funds received by @steemleak are forwarded to <a href="https://shop.wikileaks.org/donate">wikileaks</em><br /><em>See <a href="https://www.steemleak.com">steemleak.com</a> for more information</em></center>
<center><strong>This is a collection of highlights from the latest Wikileaks publication - "<a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/">The Podesta Emails</a>" . </strong></center> This publication so far has released the first <strong>2050</strong> of well over <strong>50000</strong> emails from Clinton Campaign Chairman John Podesta . The images were created by the <a href="https://wikileaks.org">wikileaks team</a> and are being spread on social media to achieve maximum impact for the most important and incriminating leaks. You can find the original posts via the <a href="https://twitter.com/wikileaks">official Wikileaks twitter account</a> for example. I am trying to add value by adding deeplinks to original emails and relevant resources where possible. Most of this initial highlights reel focuses on a particular set of emails and <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//fileid/927/180">this pdf</a> where Hillary Clinton's team have flagged her own private paid speeches that have conflicts with their own public policies. Hillary Clinton regularly uses white noise generators both <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vf5ZkGKk9SM">inside</a> and <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/hillary-clinton-static-noise-speech_us_570930dae4b0836057a16748">outside</a> her paid speech venues to drown out protesters, and prevent eavesdropping by outsiders. This isn't surprising when shes accepting money from and making plans with groups like Goldman Sachs and the Jewish United Fund Of Metropolitan Chicago among many others. The campaigns response to this publication so far: > "We're not going to confirm the authenticity of stolen documents" <center><a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/"><img src="http://imgur.com/CZg2u8J.jpg"><br />You can access the full archive for this release here https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/</a></center> <strong>Please see the previous post</strong> - "<a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-publication-the-podesta-emails-intro-by-julian-assange">Wikileaks Publication - The Podesta Emails [Intro by Julian Assange]</a>". <hr> <center><h4>You need a public position, and a private position on policy</h4></center> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/LfgDy4Y.jpg"></center> <strong>Relevant Resources</strong>: - <strong>WashingtonExaminer</strong> - <a href="http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/clintons-speeches-are-cozy-for-wall-streeters-but-closed-to-journalists/article/2553294/section/author/dan-friedman">Clintons' speeches are cozy for Wall Streeters but closed to journalists</a> - <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/927#attachments">Email 927</a> - Relevant extract below <strong>Clinton:</strong> “But If Everybody's Watching, You Know, All Of The Back Room Discussions And The Deals, You Know, Then People Get A Little Nervous, To Say The Least. So, You Need Both A Public And A Private Position. You just have to sort of figure out how to -- getting back to that word, "balance" -- how to balance the public and the private efforts that are necessary to be successful, politically, and that's not just a comment about today. That, I think, has probably been true for all of our history, and if you saw the Spielberg movie, Lincoln, and how he was maneuvering and working to get the 13th Amendment passed, and he called one of my favorite predecessors, Secretary Seward, who had been the governor and senator from New York, ran against Lincoln for president, and he told Seward, I need your help to get this done. And Seward called some of his lobbyist friends who knew how to make a deal, and they just kept going at it. <em>I mean, politics is like sausage being made. It is unsavory, and it always has been that way</em>, but we usually end up where we need to be. But if everybody's watching, you know, all of the <em>back room discussions and the deals</em>, you know, then people get a little <em>nervous</em>, to say the least. <strong>So, you need both a public and a private position. </strong> And finally, I think -- I believe in evidence-based decision making. I want to know what the facts are. I mean, it's like when you guys go into some kind of a deal, you know, are you going to do that development or not, are you going to do that renovation or not, you know, you look at the numbers. You try to figure out what's going to work and what's not going to work." <center><strong>Private paid Clinton Speech For National Multi-Housing Council, 4/24/13</strong></center> <hr> <center><h4>My dream is a hemisperic common market, with open trade and open borders</h4></center> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/scf9gd5.jpg"></center> <strong>Relevant Resources:</strong> - Wikileaks tweet - https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/784590390112419844 - <a href="https://search.wikileaks.org/?query=Banco+Itau&exact_phrase=&any_of=&exclude_words=&document_date_start=&document_date_end=&released_date_start=&released_date_end=&new_search=True&order_by=most_relevant#results">Search Banco Itau on wikileaks</a> - <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banco_Ita%C3%BA">Banco Itau on wikipedia</a> - <strong>File 05162013 Remarks to Banco Itau.doc, p. 28</strong> - <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//fileid/927/180">Hillarys Speech Transcripts PDF</a> (extract below) <center><strong>Remarks to Banco Itau</strong></center> <strong>Clinton:</strong> “My dream is a hemispheric common market, with open trade and open borders, some time in the future with energy that is as green and sustainable as we can get it, powering growth and opportunity for every person in the hemisphere.” <hr> <center><h4>Japan "Don't have a Military," and were unlikely to develop nuclear weapons capacity</h4></center> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/Nr36Na6.jpg"></center> <strong>Relevant Resources:</strong> - Wikileaks tweet - https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/784576712436776960 - Wikileaks search for "<a href="https://search.wikileaks.org/?query=&exact_phrase=goldman+sachs&any_of=&exclude_words=&document_date_start=&document_date_end=&released_date_start=&released_date_end=&new_search=True&order_by=most_relevant#results">Goldman Sachs</a>" - <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//fileid/927/180">Hillarys Speech Transcripts PDF</a> (extract below) <center><strong>Speech to Goldman Sachs, 2013 IBD Ceo Annual Conference, 6/4/13</strong></center> <strong>Mr Blankfein:</strong> "Wouldn't Japan - I mean, isn't the thinking now what is going to happen? But why wouldn't Japan at that point want to have a nuclear capability ?" <strong>Ms Clinton:</strong> "Well, that’s the problem with these arms races." <strong>Mr Blankfein:</strong> "Nuclear technology" <strong>Ms Clinton:</strong> "But they don’t have a military. They have a currently somewhat questionable and partially defunct civilian nuclear industry. So they would have to make a huge investment, which based on our assessments they don’t want to have to make “ <hr> <center><h4>Israel is working closely with Jordan to shore up king Abdullah</h4></center> <center><img src="http://i.imgur.com/wpFK3px.png"></center> <strong>Relevant Resources:</strong> - Wikileaks tweet - https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/784574732431687680 - Wikileaks search for "<a href="https://search.wikileaks.org/?query=&exact_phrase=king+abdullah&any_of=&exclude_words=&document_date_start=&document_date_end=&released_date_start=&released_date_end=&new_search=True&order_by=most_relevant#results">King Abdullah</a>" - <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//fileid/927/180">Hillarys Speech Transcripts PDF</a> (extract below) <center><strong>Jewish United Fund Of Metropolitan Chicago Vanguard Luncheon, 10/28/13</strong></center> <strong>Clinton: </strong>“So this is a country in turmoil. In my continuing contact with my, you know, counterparts, my former counterparts, in Israel, I think that they are working hard on the relationship with the new military government in Egypt which is something that’s essential for the maintenance of the Camp David Accords and just the day-to-day safety of Israel. They are working closely with the Jordanians because we want to keep, you know, <strong>shoring up King Abdullah</strong>. And they have, you know, conversations at certain levels going on with others in the region to try to insofar as possible have some coordinated approaches and actions.” <hr> <center><h4>Saudi are not stable and will get nuclear weapons</h4></center> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/3P362Cf.jpg"></center> <strong>Relevant resources:</strong> - Wikileaks tweet - https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/784572142444740615 - Wikileaks search for "<a href="https://search.wikileaks.org/?query=&exact_phrase=goldman+sachs&any_of=&exclude_words=&document_date_start=&document_date_end=&released_date_start=&released_date_end=&new_search=True&order_by=most_relevant#results">Goldman Sachs</a>" - <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//fileid/927/180">Hillarys Speech Transcripts PDF</a> (extract below) <center><strong> Speech to Goldman Sachs, 2013 IBD Ceo Annual Conference, 6/4/13</strong></center> <strong>Clinton:</strong> "So mutually assured destruction as we had with Europe in the ‘40s, ‘50s, ‘60s, ‘70s, ‘80s until the fall of the Soviet Union is much harder to do with the gulf states and it will be unlikely to occur because they will think that they have to defend themselves. And they will get into the business of nuclear weapons, and these are—the Saudis in particular are not necessarily the stablest regimes that you can find on the planet. So it’s fraught with all kinds of problems.” <hr> <center><h4>Bin Laden was discovered as a result of phone intercept, not walk-in</h4></center> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/ZdnUhv7.png"></center> <strong>Relevant resources:</strong> - Wikileaks tweet - https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/784567795170304004 - Wikileaks search for "<a href="https://search.wikileaks.org/?query=&exact_phrase=bin+laden&any_of=&exclude_words=&document_date_start=&document_date_end=&released_date_start=&released_date_end=&new_search=True&order_by=most_relevant#results">Bin Laden</a>" - <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//fileid/927/180">Hillarys Speech Transcripts PDF</a> (extract below) <center><strong>Remarks at London Drug Toronto, 11/4/13</strong></center> <strong>Clinton:</strong>“I was in the small group that recommended to the President that he go after bin Laden. The amount of work that was required to get a strong enough basis of information on which to plan took more than a decade. The people who were the analysts and collectors and good old-fashioned spies who were gathering bits and pieces of information, some of them from cell phone conversations, I will tell you, and then all of a sudden putting this matrix together and saying this guy used to protect bin Laden. He has just made a phone call. He said this in the phone call. We need to figure out where he is. Then we need to follow him And that is how we found this compound in Abbottabad. It didn’t happen because somebody walked into our embassy and said, You know, there is a suspicious compound in Abbottabad that you guys should go take a look at.” <center><em>Did Clinton break classification laws or did she mislead over this Bin Laden revelation? </em></center> <hr> <div class="pull-left"> <center><h2>Notes from @ausbitbank</h2></center> I really appreciate all the support steemians have shown so far for these publications ! There are <strong>50,000</strong> documents in total with this leak so I'm sure a lot will get missed, and I encourage others to dig through the <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/">wikileaks archives and search</a> for gold and comment below. Wikileaks supporters should also see the new <a href="https://twitter.com/WLTaskForce">Wikileaks Task Force</a>, help organise both the distribution of leaks and defence of Wikileaks. </div> <div class="pull-right"> <center><img src="https://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png"></center> <center><em>As always - all funds received by @steemleak are forwarded to <a href="https://wikileaks.org/donate">wikileaks</a><br />See <a href="https://www.steemleak.com">steemleak.com</a> for more information</em></center> </div>
<div class="pull-right"><img src="http://imgur.com/WiuZr7P.jpg"></div> <h2>The Podesta Emails: Part One</h2> <h2>Introduction by Julian Assange</h2> Today WikiLeaks begins its series on deals involving <strong>Hillary Clinton campaign Chairman John Podesta.</strong> <strong>Mr Podesta</strong> is a long-term associate of the Clintons and was President Bill Clinton's Chief of Staff from 1998 until 2001. Mr Podesta also controls the Podesta Group, a major lobbying firm and is the Chair of the Center for American Progress (CAP), a Washington DC-based think tank. <strong>Part 1 of the Podesta Emails comprises 2,060 emails and 170 attachments</strong> and focuses on Mr Podesta's communications relating to nuclear energy, and media handling over donations to the Clinton Foundation from mining and nuclear interests; 1,244 of the emails reference nuclear energy. The full collection includes emails to and from Hillary Clinton. <strong>In April 2015 the New York Times</strong> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/us/cash-flowed-to-clinton-foundation-as-russians-pressed-for-control-of-uranium-company.html?_r=0">published a story</a> about a company called "Uranium One" which was sold to Russian government-controlled interests, giving Russia effective control of one-fifth of all uranium production capacity in the United States. Since uranium is considered a strategic asset, with implications for the production of nuclear weapons, the deal had to be approved by a committee composed of representatives from a number of US government agencies. Among the agencies that eventually signed off the deal was the State Department, then headed by Secretary Clinton. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) comprises, among others, the secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce and Energy. <strong>As Russian interests gradually took control of Uranium One millions of dollars were donated to the Clinton Foundation between 2009 and 2013</strong> from individuals directly connected to the deal including the Chairman of Uranium One, Ian Telfer. Although Mrs Clinton had an agreement with the Obama White House to publicly identify all donors to the Clinton Foundation, the contributions from the Chairman of Uranium One were not publicly disclosed by the Clintons. <strong>When the New York Times article was published</strong> the Clinton campaign spokesman, Brian Fallon, strongly rejected the possibility that then-Secretary Clinton exerted any influence in the US goverment's review of the sale of Uranium One, describing this possibility as "baseless". <strong>Mr Fallon promptly sent a memo to the New York Times</strong> with a rebuttal of the story (Podesta Email ID <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//emailid/1489">1489</a>). <em>In this memo, Mr Fallon argued: </em> > "Apart from the fact that the State Department was one of just nine agencies involved in CFIUS, it is also true that within the State Department, the CFIUS approval process historically does not trigger the personal involvement of the Secretary of State. The State Department’s principal representative to CFIUS was the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs. During the time period in question, that position was held by Jose Fernandez. As you are aware, Mr Fernandez has personally attested that “Secretary Clinton never intervened with me on any CFIUS matter.” <strong>What the Clinton campaign spokesman failed to disclose</strong>, however, was the fact that a few days before sending his rebuttal to the New York Times, Jose Fernandez wrote on the evening of the 17 April 2015 to John Podesta following a phone call from Mr Podesta (Email ID <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//emailid/2053">2053</a>): > "John, It was good to talk to you this afternoon, and I appreciate your taking the time to call. As I mentioned, I would like to do all I can to support Secretary Clinton, and would welcome your advice and help in steering me to the right persons in the campaign". <strong>Five days after this email (22 April 2015)</strong>, Clinton spokesman Brian Fallon wrote a memo to the New York Times, declaring that "Jose Fernandez has personally attested that 'Secretary Clinton never intervened with me on any CFIUS matter',” but Fallon failed to mention that Fernandez was hardly a neutral witness in this case, considering that he had agreed with John Podesta to play a role in the Clinton campaign. The emails show that the contacts between John Podesta and Jose Fernandez go back to the time of internal Clinton campaign concern about the then-forthcoming book and movie "Clinton Cash" by Peter Schweizer on the financial dealings of the Clinton Foundation. <strong>In an email dated 29 March 2015</strong> (Email ID <a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails//emailid/2059">2059</a>), Jose Fernandez writes to Podesta: > "Hi John, I trust you are getting a brief rest after a job well done. Thanks no doubt to your recommendation I have joined the CAP [Center for American Progress] board of trustees, which I'm finding extremely rewarding." <em>Julian Assange</em> <br /> <strong>Statement Source :</strong> https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/press-release <center><a href="https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/"><img src="http://imgur.com/CZg2u8J.png"><br />You can access the full archive for this release here<br />https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/</a></center> <hr> <div class="pull-left"> <center><h2>Notes from @ausbitbank</h2></center> The next 10 weeks will be full of releases from Wikileaks , I'll do my best to keep up and make compilation posts where I attempt to display key parts of the leaks in an interesting way. The wikileaks team has been working overtime extracting and screenshoting key parts of incriminating emails , I plan to compile these into regular digest posts and get them on steemit, linking back to the full emails on <a href="https://wikileaks.org">wikileaks.org</a>. <center><em>As always all donations and votes received by @steemleak are forwarded to <a href="https://wikileaks.org/donate/">wikileaks</a>.</em><br /><a href="https://www.steemleak.com">See steemleak.com for more information</a></center> </div> <div class="pull-right"> <br /><br /><br /> <img src="https://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png"> </div>
A hacker who goes by the name Guccifer 2.0 claims to have successfully hacked the Clinton Foundation and has posted some of what he has found at this link... https://guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/10/04/clinton-foundation/ Whether or not this hack contains any useful data has yet to be seen, by me at least, but it is an interesting development at the least, specially after this morning's rather disappointing October surprise.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=947fP6QTmBo <center><strong>This is the beginning of a few weeks of celebrations of the 10th anniversary of Wikileaks !</strong></center> The stream above is from "Right Side Broadcasting" , and you can find <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-sVGIp6E9g">alternative coverage by Alex Jones's infowars network</a>, but so far they have been cutting away from the live wikileaks presentation constantly for self promotion. <strong>At the time of posting we are about 10 minutes away from Assange speaking.</strong> Today was the day the <a href="https://wikileaks.org">wikileaks.org</a> domain was registered: >[whois.pir.org] Domain Name: WIKILEAKS.ORG Domain ID: D130035267-LROR WHOIS Server: Referral URL: http://www.dynadot.com Updated Date: 2015-10-27T17:08:53Z <strong>Creation Date: 2006-10-04T05:54:19Z</strong> Registry Expiry Date: 2018-10-04T05:54:19Z <strong>Updates:</strong> Unfortunately the audio quality isn't great, and it seems they aren't going to release new documents tonight. Digging back through what wikileaks themselves has been saying - they never actually said there would be a release here tonight - <em>they simply didn't squash other peoples rumours that there would be</em> :P Here is the media pack sent out before the event that I didn't see till now - https://wikileaks.org/10years/WikiLeaks10yrsPressPack.pdf - Alex Jones has turned openly hostile against Julian because he pulled an all nighter for "nothing" - @skeptic has the best collection of <a href="https://steemit.com/news/@skeptic/watching-wikileaks-live">wikileaks stream links I've spotted so far</a> - @officialfuzzy started a <a href="https://steemit.com/beyondbitcoin/@officialfuzzy/join-us-live-on-beyond-bitcoin-mumble-for-a-special-hillaryleak-hangout">mumble server and <del>is</del> was also streaming audio of assange</a>. So that was a little anti-climactic - but don't lose faith , more leaks are coming soon: <center><img src="https://steempixel.com/tweet/https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/783235313615405056"></center> <center><em>Watch this space and follow @steemleak as we put major leaks on the steem blockchain :)</em></center> <hr> <div class="pull-left"> <br /> <center><strong>Please show your support for Wikileaks by upvoting and resteeming, and discuss in the comments below!</strong> <em>All funds raised by @steemleak are donated to wikileaks - for more information see <a href="https://www.steemleak.com">steemleak.com</a></em></center> </div> <div class="pull-right"><img src="https://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png"></div>
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<center><h3>Description and explanation</h3></center>
Note: This is a markdown recreation of the <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/analysis/201609_TiSA_Analysis-on-Core-Text/">Wikileaks analysis</a> of a <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/document/20160621_TiSA_Core-Text/20160621_TiSA_Core-Text.pdf">leaked PDF file</a> of the draft Trade in Services Act from the <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/releases/#September%2015,%202016%20Publication">Wikileaks September 15th 2016 publication</a>.
I'm publishing this (and further analysis) to the steem blockchain because I believe its valuable information regarding one of the worlds largest trade deals, being negotiated by your government <em>in secret</em> that affects you.
<strong>See also:</strong> <em><a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-publication-tisa-core-text-draft">TISA core text draft</a>.</em>
<center><em>As always all donations and votes received by @steemleak are <a href="https://www.steemleak.com/">forwarded to wikileaks</a>.</em></center>
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<center><h3>TISA: UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE LEAKED ‘CORE TEXT’ FROM JULY 2016</h3></center>
The Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) is being negotiated by a self-selected group of mainly rich countries, calling themselves the ‘Really Good Friends of Services’. The leaked ‘core’ text provides further evidence of their game plan to bypass other governments in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and rewrite its services agreement in the interests of their corporations. It also makes the new risks from TISA to governments’ right to regulate in their national interest much clearer.
Many of the basic rules are carried over from the WTO’S General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), so that TISA can be exported back into the WTO without having to revise the core rules. By adding new rules and changing some existing ones they aim to tighten the handcuffs on the freedom of governments to regulate their services.
<strong>This paper updates the earlier analysis by referring to the July 2016 draft text. It comments on two areas of controversy: I) the most-favoured-nation (MFN) provision, which requires a TiSA party to give services and service suppliers from a TiSA country the best treatment it gives those of any other country; and (ii) rules that will restrict certain kinds of domestic regulation of services, which are also subject to a separate annex. Comments on these two issue are inserted in bold italics into the previous analysis of the core TiSA text on pages 5-6 (MFN) and pages 78 (domestic regulation) of this paper. The proposed structure of TiSA has also been updated.</strong>
<h3>What TISA reinforces</h3>
While TISA threatens to impose more extreme restrictions on governments, the problem lies with the core rules themselves. The following illustrates some of their main implications `1` (<em>see footnotes for references to the leaked text</em>):
➢ Trade in services agreements treat services as marketable commodities, `2` and deny or subordinate or deny altogether their social, cultural, environmental, employment, and development functions. People are not viewed as citizens or members of their communities they are ‘consumers’. `3`
➢ Those who provide the services do not need to have any connection to the people or communities that rely on their services they can be ‘supplied’ from offshore, `4` or by a temporary visitor, `5` or through foreign firms who establish a local presence but whose priority is to deliver profits to offshore shareholders. `6` None of these ‘suppliers’ has any longterm responsibility or accountability to the country that ‘consumes’ them.
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- Professor Jane Kelsey, Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand
`1` This list is illustrative and not an extensive analysis of all the GATS rules carried through to TiSA.
`2` Article I-2(g)
`3` Article I-2(g) and (i)
`4` Article I-1.2 (a) and (b)
`5` Article I-1.2 (d)
`6` Article I-1.2(c) and Article I-2 (d)
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➢Governments sign away their right to give preferences to local providers of services, such as broadcasting, education, electricity or sanitation, or to limit foreign investors and require majority local directors for sensitive services sectors. `7`
➢ The core rules on market access restrict governments’ ability to shape those ‘markets’ by limiting the size or growth of certain activities, such as banks, tourist ventures or hypermarkets, whether nationwide or in local areas, and whether they are locally or foreign owned. `8`
➢ The restrictions apply at central and local government level, and nongovernment bodies like professional bodies. `9`
➢ These rules are sweeping in their scope, because they limit governments’ rights to use almost every tool available to them any law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action or any other form. `10`
➢ They also apply to any measures that ‘affect’ ‘trade’ in a service, `11` even if it does so indirectly, such as payment or distribution systems, or for a noncommercial reason, for example environmental objectives, or restrictions on sale of unhealthy products.
➢ Further, they apply to any aspects of the supply chain for a particular service its production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery. `12`
➢ A public or private monopoly, such as a postal service or agricultural marketing and distribution board can be challenged for using its monopoly to cross subsidise or advantage any nonmonopoly services it provides. `13`
➢ The pretend ‘carveout for public services’ only applies to the very rare situations where a service is provided through a public monopoly for free. `14`
➢ The exceptions for public health, environment, public order and morality must be established as a defence to a complaint, and are subject to many onerous tests. `15` They have proven ineffective as safeguards in the WTO, succeeding fully in only 1 out of more than 40 disputes. `16`
➢ Privacy protections are illusory. In addition to all the hurdles for other exceptions, laws and regulations to protect individual’s privacy in relation to processing and disseminating personal data and protecting confidentiality must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the agreement! `17`
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`7`Article I4
`8` Article I3
`9` Article I1.3(a). As with the GATS, there is a requirement for central government to ‘<em>take such measures as may be reasonably available to it to ensure their observance</em>’; some more recent FTAs apply to all levels of government without that proviso.
`10` Article 12(a)
`11` Article I2(c)
`12` Article I2(b)
`13` Article [... ] Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers
`14` Article I1.3(b) and (c)
`15` Article I9
`16` https://www.citizen.org/documents/general-exception.pdf
`17` Article I9(ii). See the discussion of the leaked TiSA ecommerce text. For reasons that are not clear, the text from the GATS on the right not to disclose confidential information that would impede law enforcement, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, is in square brackets denoting disagreement.
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➢ Governments cannot restrict crossborder movements of capital that are essential to a service, or inflows of capital that relate to foreign investment, where they have made commitments in those services. 18 There are very limited options for governments to impose capital controls, even in situations of an actual or threatened balance of payments emergency. If they manage to meet those circumstances, the kinds of controls they can adopt are severely limited and would face a high risk of being challenged. `19`
<h3>What is new about TISA </h3>
<strong>Services are much more exposed to existing and new rules:</strong> Three features of TISA combine to go far beyond the GATS. First, the core rules are supplemented by new substantive restrictions on what governments can do.
Second, there are new or more extensive criteria for decision-making and rights for commercial firms, including foreign firms, to pressure governments to protect their interests.
Third, changes to scheduling bring more services under the two main rules on non-discrimination in favour of locals (national treatment) and not restricting the size and shape of, and foreign presence in, the market (market access). The TISA text also anticipates much greater use of ‘additional commitments’, whereby governments will become bound to a range of new restrictions on certain activities or sectors, which may or may not be linked to
the schedules. `20`
<strong>Scheduling:</strong> In the GATS, the national treatment and market access rules only apply to the services that governments agree to make subject to them. Each country has its own list or schedule, and there are several ways to limit its exposure – for example, not committing to the nondiscrimination rule or retaining the right to limit its ‘market’ in certain ways. It can also limit its exposure to certain ways of delivering the service, for example by a foreign investor or over the Internet.
Part II of TISA sets out different rules for market access and national treatment, although the provisions refer to Sections A and B and Parts I and II of schedules that are not explained in this text. Services sectors are still brought under the market access rule using a positive list, meaning it only applies to a sector that is explicitly committed, and is subject to any limitations that are specified. `21`
National treatment (foreign services and suppliers must be treated at least as well as their local counterparts) is where the major change occurs. It is presumed that all services, and all ways of supplying them, are covered by the TISA rule, unless they are explicitly protected.
A government can protect the future right to use a measure that relates to a sector, subsector or activity by listing it in Section A of Part 1 of its schedule. `22`
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`18` Article I3 fn 2 and Article I7
`19` Article I8: Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments
`20` Article I5: Additional Commitments
`21` Article II1: Scheduling of Market Access Commitments
`22` Article II2.4: Scheduling of National Treatment Commitments, through Section A of Part I of its Schedule.
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A government can also list lesser protections in its schedule, `23` which preserves its right to apply current measures that breach the national treatment rule. However, it cannot increase the level of ‘noncompliance’ `24` (ie new restrictions on foreign firms or benefits to local ones) and a ratchet will apply that automatically locks in any new liberalisation. `25`
Sectors that are not listed in the schedule under one or other of these parts will be required to apply the national treatment rule, potentially forever. This ‘negative list’ approach is designed to extend a government’s obligations under TISA far beyond the positive list approach of the GATS, and puts a country’s future regulatory capacity at risk of error, omission, unforeseen or unforeseeable situation, or a highly liberalising government that is intent on binding the hands of its successors.
The EU has also proposed a special schedule for the temporary movement of (elite) services personnel, which appears to apply a positive list approach to both market access and national treatment rules.
<strong>Making the new sectoral and other annexes part of the agreement:</strong> The other major expansion of the GATS is through new ‘disciplines’, such as those on domestic regulation, transparency, and ecommerce, and new or revised annexes on specific sectors, such as maritime transport, telecommunications and financial services. `26` The TISA parties want to make sure that these are considered part of the actual agreement, especially as their game plan is to get TISA recognised as a plurilateral agreement in the WTO. They also want to make sure the new disciplines and sectoral annexes are in a form that allows them to be included in countries’ GATS schedules as ‘additional commitments’.
<strong>No special treatment for developing countries:</strong> None of the development provisions in the GATS are repeated in the core TISA text. Clearly ‘gold standard’ does not allow for any development sensitivities. That includes the requirement in GATS that much less is asked of developing countries when they enter into nonWTO trade in services agreements, and that the other countries make concessions in areas of interest to developing countries. That means any developing country participation in, or seeking to join, TISA will be subject to the same
onerous rules.
<strong>Some existing provisions may be expanded, depending on ‘new and enhanced disciplines’:</strong>
There may be new definitions, `27` changes to the mechanism for adopting ‘additional commitments’, `28` and to the provision on Annexes, 29 depending on what is in the ‘new and enhanced disciplines’ being developed under TISA. (Please refer to the other leaked TISA documents).
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`23` Article II2.1, through Section B or Part I or Part II of its Schedule
`24` Article II2.2
`25` Article II2.3
`26` Drafter’s note to Article [...]: Annexes
`27` Drafter’s note at end of Article I2
`28` Placeholder: [Article II4: Scheduling Additional Commitments] [Under discussion]
`29` Article [...] Annexes
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<h3>Where have they not agreed ..</h3>
<strong>The ratchet effect of other agreements into TISA by the most-favoured-nation’ (MFN) rule : </strong>
Under the ‘most-favoured-nation’ rule all parties to TISA are entitled the best treatment that a government gives to the ‘like’ services and suppliers of any other country, for any measure that is covered by the agreement, even if that other country is not a TISA party or even a member of the WTO. `30` How far governments can limit this rule is especially important because TISA countries that have signed up to stronger rules and obligations in other free trade or investment agreements could have to provide the same treatment to all the other TISA countries.
The entire provision on Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment has square brackets that indicate it has not been agreed to. The text reveals several points of disagreement, although it is understood that there are three options under consideration:
<strong>(i) the MFN obligation applies without qualification.</strong> That would mean that any better
treatment given through any existing or future agreement would have to be shared, as well as any better treatment given on an individual basis, for example through an administrative decision on granting a license or approving a foreign direct investment in a service sector. This would have a massive ratcheting effect that maximises liberalisation, without the country even being able to claim it was receiving some corresponding benefit in return.
<strong>(ii) no MFN provision.</strong> This would give governments the most control over the expansion of the scope of TiSA, and is therefore objected to by TiSA advocates because it has the least liberalizing effect.
<strong>(iii) an MFN provision with an exclusion for economic integration agreements</strong> that meet the
requirement in Article V of the GATS for exemption from the MFN obligation. That requires the agreement to cover substantial services sectors, weighted according to the ‘trade in services’ between the parties, and is meant to include special flexibilities for developing countries (although this requirement is often ignored, as it is in TiSA itself).
<strong>The July 2016 text shows that the Switzerland and Norway have joined the EU in objecting to the MFN obligation unless there is a proviso is included. The US remains opposed to an article that cross-references MFN to economic integration agreements. </strong>`31`
However, Switzerland and Norway appear to limit the restriction on MFN to <strong>existing</strong> agreements that have been entered into and have been notified to the WTO as complying with the GATS Article V rules, or that the country <strong>is</strong> entering into, which suggests the negotiation is concluded and is in the process of approval. Turkey wants it to extend to <strong>future</strong> agreements as well.
Japan and Colombia suggest a negatively worded right to enter into FTAs that cover services, provided they are notified to the WTO as complying with the GATS rules.
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`30` Article [...] Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
`31` [Article [...] Economic Integration – GATS Article V] [Linked to Article on MFN]
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Colombia is also concerned to prevent one TISA party, or one of its investors, from using the MFN provision in TiSA to say it is entitled to the same rights another TiSA party has given to another country and its investors through a bilateral investment treaty or an investment chapter in an FTA, including controversial investor protections and their enforcement through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). A recent attempt by a foreign investor to use the MFN provision in the GATS to gain access to ISDS in a bilateral investment treaty was rejected, but it was a majority decision of two arbitrators to one and could have gone the other way. `32`
Under the GATS, countries could list any measures they wanted to exempt from this, but they had to do so at the time they adopted the GATS. Importantly, this is a negative list of what is excluded from the MFN rule, although it is not limited to FTAs and c an include, for example, preferences for film co-production arrangements, rights of access for categories of workers from specific countries, or obligations to developing countries. The GATS exemptions were meant to be temporary and be reviewed after 5 years, but most of those that were scheduled in 1994 are still in place. The TISA parties disagree about how the way those exemptions should be identified, and whether it should be subject to the same conditions as the GATS (meaning they are temporary and reviewed after 5 years).
<strong>Government procurement is more extensively covered: </strong> TISA repeats part of the GATS provision on government procurement, which says the non-discrimination and market access rules do not apply to rules, regulations and requirements where government agencies procure services. But that exclusion only applies where the services are procured for governmental purposes and not for commercial resale or to use in the supply of services for sale. It would not apply where governments are contracting for supply of electricity or water services, or construction and operation of transport or social services through public private partnerships and contracts.
The TISA provision reiterates the GATS provision, `33` but drops the reference to future negotiations on government procurement of services. The entire government procurement provision in the core text is in square brackets. However, there is a separate proposal on government procurement; the analysis of that leaked proposal explains its implications . `34`
<strong>Requiring Reviews of Administrative Decisions:</strong> A large number of countries want all parties to maintain tribunals or procedures where an aggrieved service firm can obtain prompt review of administrative decisions that ‘affect trade in services’, and appropriate remedies where they are justified. `35` If the procedures are not independent of the agency that made the decision it needs to provide for an ‘objective and impartial review’. Similar language was proposed for the Domestic Regulation Annex, `36` and may be moved into the core text. <strong>Only Mauritius appears to oppose this. There is stronger disagreement on whether governments
can establish the tribunals or procedures ‘as soon as practicable’ or they must be in existence at time agreement comes into force – countries like Australia, Canada, the US, EU and Japan oppose such flexibility. </strong>
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`32` Jarrod Hepburn, ‘ICSID tribunal rejects bid to use WTO agreement as gateway to investment treaty arbitration’, <em>Investment Arbitration Reporter</em>, 7 August 2016
`33` [GATS Article XIII: Government Procurement]
`34` See new analysis on Wikileaks
`35` Article [...]: Review of Administrative Decisions]
<hr>
<strong>Domestic Regulation:</strong> The provision on domestic regulation in the core text is much more limited than in the annex on domestic regulation that has been leaked several t imes. `37` The US has a longstanding sensitivity over certain ‘disciplines on domestic regulation’ and has blocked their development in the GATS. The more extensive ‘disciplines’ in the annex reflect that tension between the US and countries like Australia and New Zealand that propose strong restrictions on how governments regulate, especially for technical standards for services, professional qualification and, licensing requirements.
The core text has a rhetorical paragraph that affirms the right of governments to regulate and introduce new regulations, which was moved from the Annex to the core text. However, this ‘right to regulate’ is still subject to compliance with the TISA rules. `38` There is disagreement on whether the goal of regulation should be for public policy or just policy objectives – Switzerland’s reference to ‘national policy’ objectives has been dropped.
There is considerable disagreement on whether there needs to be specific reference to the right to regulate for universal service obligations (often used, for example, for telecommunications or postal services). Switzerland, Hong Kong, Mexico and Turkey are proposing such a reference, but its effect is weak. It says the domestic regulation rules do not prevent members from introducing or maintaining regulations to ensure provision of universal service obligations – but it does not allow them to adopt an approach that is inconsistent with the rules in the agreement. Hong Kong suggests making it explicit that universal service provision must be consistent with a party’s obligations and commitments in TiSA. Reference to universal service obligations is opposed by countries like Australia, Canada, the US, EU, Japan and Norway, presumably on the basis that this is covered by the
rhetorical affirmation of the ‘right to regulate’.
The GATS also has a sweeping provision that says all measures of general application that affect trade in services must be administered in a ‘reasonable, objective and impartial manner’. That only applies to ‘sectors where specific commitments are undertaken’. That was problematic in itself, because it was not clear whether a very small commitment in one services subsector, in one mode, subject to many limitations, brought that entire service
sector under this discipline. It becomes even more problematic in TiSA because of the hybrid positive and negative list of scheduling. The US wants to make sure the obligation is still limited by a Party’s schedule, but is debating the right wording. Other countries, such as Australia, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand and Norway want it to apply across the board.
https://wikileaks.org/tisa/domestic/analysis/Analysis-TiSA-Domestic-Regulation-Annex.pdf
<hr>
`36` February 2014 text (https://wikileaks.org/tisa/domestic/) and analysis (<a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/domestic/analysis/Analysis-TiSA-Domestic-Regulation-Annex.pdf">https://wikileaks.org/tisa/domestic/analysis/Analysis-TiSA-Domestic-Regulation-Annex.pdf</a>) . See new text and analysis on Wikileaks
`37` TiSA Annex on Domestic Regulation, <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/document/20150423_Annex-on-Domestic-Regulation/">https://wikileaks.org/tisa/document/20150423_Annex-on-Domestic-Regulation/</a>
`38` [Article [...] Domestic Regulation]
<hr>
<strong>Transparency:</strong> There is a placeholder for a core provision on transparency, with a cross-reference to a US text proposal. It is clear that transparency will go beyond the GATS requirement to publish relevant measures of general application. ‘Transparency’ in TISA means ensuring that commercial interests, especially but not only transnational corporations, can access and influence government decisions that affect their interests rights and opportunities that may not be available to local business or to national citizens. They may want to stop or change government decisions they don’t like, or rally to support those that are being challenged. Several texts on Transparency have been leaked, along with transparency provisions in other chapters. (Please see the separate analyses of these documents. `39` ) `40`
<strong>Subsidies:</strong> There is simply a placeholder for a provision on subsidies. Subsidies are a ‘measure’
covered by the core rules. It would breach the national treatment rule to restrict them to domestic services and suppliers, unless the right to do so has been protected in the schedule. The actual texts of some FTAs have excluded subsidies (and even grants and similar supports) from the rules.
There is no indication of whether that is being considered for TISA, or whether they are considering whether to repeat the GATS provision that commits to negotiate rules on ‘trade distorting subsidies’ and provide consultations where a party says it has been disadvantaged by payment of a subsidy a provision that has largely been ignored.
<hr>
`39` 223 January 2015 text (https://wikileaks.org/tisa/transparency/01 2015/) and analysis (https://wikileaks.org/tisa/domestic/analysis/AnalysisTiSATransparencyArticle.pdf)
`40` [Placeholder for subsidies]
<hr>
<center><h4>TECHNICAL NOTES </h4></center>
<h3>The structure of TISA </h3>
As expected, many basic provisions of what is called the ‘core text’ for TISA are identical to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in the World Trade Organization (WTO). That is to make it easier to integrated back into the GATS. New schedules of commitments of sectors will greatly extend the coverage and impact of the rules. In addition there will be referred to as ‘new and enhanced disciplines’. Disciplines are tradespeak for restrictions on
what governments can do in relation to services.
Provisions that are different from the GATS are in italics. The corresponding GATS provision is in brackets.
<h3>PREAMBLE </h3>
<h3>PART 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS </h3>
Scope (Art 1 and Art 28)
<em>Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (Art 2) </em>
<em>Economic Integration (Art 5) </em>
Market access (Art 16)
National treatment (Art 17)
Disclosure of Confidential Information (Art III bis)
<em>Domestic Regulation (Art 6)</em>
<em>Additional Commitments (Art 18) </em>
<em>Review of Administrative Decisions (new) </em>
<em>Transparency (Art III) </em>
Recognition (Art 7)
Payments and Transfers (Art 11)
<em>Restrictions to Safeguards for Balance of Payments (Art 12) </em>
<em>Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers (Art 8) </em>
General Exceptions (Art 14)
Security Exceptions (Art 14 bis)
Denial of Benefits (Art 28)
<em>Government Procurement (Art 13)</em>
<em>(Subsidies: Art 15) </em>
<h3>PART II: SCHEDULING COMMITMENTS </h3>
<em>Scheduling of Market Access Commitments (cf Art 20) </em>
<em>Scheduling of National Treatment Commitments (cf Art 20) </em>
<em>Scheduling Measures Inconsistent with both Market Access and National Treatment (cf Art 20) </em>
<em>Scheduling of Additional Commitments (cf Art 20) </em>
<h3>[PART III: NEW AND ENHANCED DISCIPLINES </h3>
<h4>PROPOSED ANNEXES</h4>
Distribution services
Domestic Regulation
E-Commerce
Energy
Environmental
Financial Services
Government Procurement
Localisation
Movement of natural persons
Postal
Professional Services
Telecommunications
Transparency
Transport:
<ul><li>Air</li><li>Maritime</li><li>Road</li></ul>
<h3>PART IV: INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS (as proposed by EU) </h3>
Establishment of TiSA Committee
Chair of TiSA Committee
Functions of TiSA Committee
Decision making
Notification of the intent to modify or withdraw commitments
Compensatory adjustments
Openness [to accession]
Procedures and requirements [for accession]
Objective of multilateralization
Process leading to multilateralization
Annexes, Protocols and footnotes
Authentic texts
Depositary
Entry into Force
Amendments
Withdrawal
Relation to other Agreements
Reservations
Private Rights
<h3>Dispute settlement [as proposed by EU]</h3>
General provisions
Adjudication procedure
Panels
Panel proceedings
Compliance
Suspension and termination procedures
Mediation
Annex I: Rules of Procedure
Annex II; Code of Conduct for Arbitrators and Mediators
<h3>Standard provisions of GATS in TISA </h3>
Because the core text reflects the strategy of creating a text that can ‘dock’ with the GATS many of the core definitions and rules about coverage are also the same:
- definitions
- measures
- supply of services
- ‘modes’ of supplying services;
- sector
- commercial presence
- application to local government
- services supplied in exercise of government authority
- monopoly
<hr>
<div class="pull-left">
<center><h3>Notes from @ausbitbank</h3></center>
This analysis makes a lot more sense if you open a second browser window to <a href="https://steemit.com/steemleak/@steemleak/wikileaks-publication-tisa-core-text-draft">the original leaked core text</a> and use <strong>control-f</strong> to search for the articles being referred to.
<em>Please</em> <strong>show your support for Wikileaks by upvoting and resteeming, and discuss in the comments below!</strong>
<center><em>All funds raised by @steemleak are donated to wikileaks - for more information see <a href="https://www.steemleak.com/">steemleak.com</a></em></center>
</div>
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<center><h2>Description and explanation</h2></center>
<div class="pull-right">
<img src="http://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png">
</div>
<div class="pull-left">
<strong>Note:</strong> This is a markdown recreation of a <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/document/20160621_TiSA_Core-Text/20160621_TiSA_Core-Text.pdf">leaked PDF file</a> of the draft Trade in Services Act from <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/releases/#September%2015,%202016%20Publication">Wikileaks September 15th 2016 publication</a>.
I'm publishing this (and further analysis) to the steem blockchain because I believe its valuable information regarding one of the worlds largest trade deals, being negotiated by your government <em>in secret</em> that affects <strong>you</strong>.
<center><em>As always all donations and votes received by @steemleak are <a href="https://www.steemleak.com">forwarded to wikileaks</a>.</em></center>
</div>
<hr>
Limited Copy for the Council and the European Parliament
Without prejudice
<strong>Limited distribution – for TiSA participants only</strong>
<center><h3>TiSA</h3></center>
<center><h2>TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT</h2></center>
<center>DRAFT PROVISIONS – 21 June 2016</center>
[This text includes all proposals related to the framework of the agreement, but does not include
proposals on new and enhanced disciplines and institutional provisions (including dispute resolution).]
><strong>PE:</strong> Will address the issue of ‘like circumstances’ in its schedule
<center><h3>PREAMBLE</h3></center>
<center>[...]</center>
<strong>Part 1 - General Provisions</strong>
<center><strong>Article I-1: Scope</strong></center>
1. This Agreement applies to measures be [the] Parties affecting trade in services.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a service:
(a) from the territory of one Party into the territory of any other Party;
(b) in the territory of one Party to the service consumer of any other Party;
(c) by a service supplier of one Party, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Party;
(d) by a service supplier of one Party, through presence of natural persons of a Party in the territory of any other Party.
3. For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) "measures by [the] Parties" means measures taken by:
(i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and
<center><em>Page 1</em></center>
<hr>
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or local governments or authorities;
In fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the Agreement, each Party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure their observance by regional and local governments and authorities and non-governmental bodies within its territory;
(b) "services" includes any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority;
(c) "a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" means any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers
<center><strong>Article I-2: Definitions</strong></center>
<strong>For the purpose of this Agreement:</strong>
(a) "measure" means any measure by a Party, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form;
(b) "supply of a service" includes the production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery of a service;
(c) "measures by [the] Parties affecting trade in services" include measures in respect of
(i) the purchase, payment or use of a service;
(ii) the access to and use of, in connection with the supply of a service, services which are required by those Parties to be offered to the public generally;
(iii) the presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Party for the supply of a service in the territory of another Party;
(d) "commercial presence" means any type of business or professional establishment, including through
(i) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or
(ii) the creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office,
within the territory of a Party for the purpose of supplying a service;
<center><em>Page 2</em></center>
<hr>
(e) "sector" of a service means,
(i) with reference to a [specific] commitment, one or more, or all, sub-sectors of that service, as specified in a Party's Schedule,
(ii) otherwise, the whole of that service sector, including all of its sub-sectors;
(f) "service of another Party" means a service which is supplied,
(i) from or in the territory of that other Party, or in the case of maritime transport, by a vessel registered under the laws of that other Party, or by a person of that other Party which supplies the service through the operation of a vessel and/or its use in whole or in part; or
(ii) in the case of the supply of a service through commercial presence or through the presence of natural persons, by a service supplier of that other Party;
(g) "service supplier" means any person that supplies a service; (<em>See note 1</em>)
(h) "monopoly supplier of a service" means any person, public or private, which in the relevant market of the territory of a Party is authorized or established formally or in effect by that Party as the sole supplier of that service;
(I) "service consumer" means any person that receives or uses a service;
(j) "person" means either a natural person or a juridical person;
(k) "natural person of another Party" means a natural person who resides in the territory of that
other Party or any other Party, and who under the law of that other Party:
(i) is a national of that other Party; or
(ii) has the right of permanent residence in that other Party, in the case of a Party which:
1. does not have nationals; or
2. accords substantially the same treatment to its permanent residents as it does to its nationals in respect of measures affecting trade in services, as notified in its acceptance of or accession to the WTO agreement, provided that no Party is obligated to accord to such permanent residents treatment more favorable than would be accorded by that other Party to such permanent residents;
<hr>
<strong>Note 1.</strong> <em>Where the service is not supplied directly by a juridical person but through other forms of commercial presence such as a branch or a representative office, the service supplier (i.e. the juridical person) shall, nonetheless, through such presence be accorded the treatment provided for service suppliers under the Agreement. Such treatment shall be extended to the presence through which the service is supplied and need not be extended to any other parts of the supplier located outside the territory where the service is supplied.</em>
<center><em>Page 3</em></center>
<hr>
(l) "juridical person" means any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise organized under applicable law, whether for profit or otherwise, and whether privately-owned or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship or association;
(m) "juridical person of another Party" means a juridical person which is either:
(i) constituted or otherwise organized under the law of that other Party, and is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of that Party or any other Party; or
(ii) in the case of the supply of a service through commercial presence, owned or controlled by:
1. natural persons of that Party; or
2. juridical persons of that other Party identified under subparagraph (i);
(n) a juridical person is:
(i) "owned" by persons of a Party if more than 50 per cent of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that Party;
(ii) "controlled" by persons of a Party if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions;
(iii) "affiliated" with another person when it controls, or is controlled by, that other person; or when it and the other person are both controlled by the same person;
(o) "direct taxes" comprise all taxes on total income, on total capital or on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the alienation of property, taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts, and taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises, as well as taxes on capital appreciation
` Further definitions to be developed as necessary`
><strong>AU:</strong> We also need to include the Marrakesh Agreement Explanatory Notes on the meaning of the
term “country”, if “country” is used in the TiSA.
<center><em>Page 4</em></center>
<hr>
><strong>TW:</strong> With respect to Australia’s proposal, we propose an alternative in the Part IV (Institutional Provisions), Section 4 to deal with all the terms not defined by the TiSA, in the case that the TiSA Parties deem it necessary and appropriate to harmonize the WTO and the TiSA interpretations
(p) <strong>[AU propose:</strong> “country” or “countries” as used in this Agreement include any separate customs territory Member of the WTO. In the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, where an expression in this Agreement is qualified by the term “national”, such expression shall be read as pertaining to that customs territory, unless otherwise specified.]
<center><strong>[Article [...] : Most-Favored-Nation Treatment</strong></center>
><strong>CH/EU/NO:</strong> delete unless there is a parallel economic integration article below
1. With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Party shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.
2. A Party may maintain a measure inconsistent with paragraph 1 provided that such a measure is listed in <strong>[AU/CH/EU propose:</strong> its [List of [MFN] <strong>[JP propose:</strong> Article […] Exemptions][<strong>CH propose; AU/EU oppose:</strong> , and meets the conditions of the Annex on Article II Exemptions of the GATS].]
><strong>CO:</strong> will propose a text similar to GATS Article XXII:3 in order to clarify the impossibility to invoke the MFN Article under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of TiSA with respect to commitments taken under other international agreements particularly BIT's .
3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be so construed as to prevent any Party from conferring or according advantages to adjacent countries in order to facilitate exchanges limited to contiguous frontier zones of services that are both locally produced and consumed.]
<center><em>Page 5</em></center>
<hr>
<center><strong>[Article [...] Economic Integration – GATS Article V]
[Linked to Article on MFN</strong></center>
`US: proposes deletion of this article`
><strong>[CO propose: [JP propose: </strong>This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Parties from being a Party to
or entering into an] agreement notified under Article V or Article V bis of the GATS.]
><strong>[CH/TR/NO propose: </strong>Paragraph 1 of Article [MFN] shall not apply to agreements to which a Party is
a party or <strong>[TR oppose:</strong> is] <strong>[TR propose:</strong> will be] entering into and which liberalize trade in services between or among their parties, provided that such agreements are notified under Article V or Article V
bis of the GATS.]
<center><strong>Article I-3: Market Access</strong></center>
1. With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article I-1, each Party shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Party treatment no less favorable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule. (<em>See note 2</em>)
2. In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a Party shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test;
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; (<em>See note 3</em>)
<hr>
<strong>Note 2</strong> If a Party undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of Article I-1 and if the cross-border movement of capital is an essential part of the service itself, that Party is thereby committed to allow such movement of capital. If a Party undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of Article I-1, it is thereby committed to allow related transfers of capital into its territory.
<strong>Note 3</strong> Subparagraph 2(c) does not cover measures of a Party which limit inputs for the supply of services
<center><em>Page 6</em></center>
<hr>
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific service in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service; and
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.
<center><strong>Article I-4: National Treatment</strong></center>
1. Subject to any conditions and qualifications set out in its Schedule, each Party shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Party, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. (<em>See note 4</em>)
2. A Party may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to services and service suppliers of any other Party, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favorable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favor of services or service suppliers of the Party compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Party.
<center><strong>Article I-5: Additional commitments</strong></center>
Parties may negotiate commitments with respect to measures affecting trade in services not subject to scheduling under Articles [I-3] or I-4, including those regarding qualifications, standards or licensing matters. Such commitments shall be inscribed in a Party’s Schedule.
`Might need to be reviewed depending on outcome of discussion on new and enhanced disciplines.`
<hr>
<strong>Note 4</strong> [Specific] commitments assumed under this Article shall not be construed to require any Party to compensate for anyinherent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the relevant services or service suppliers
<center><em>Page 7</em></strong>
<hr>
<center><strong>[Article [...] Transparency]</strong></center>
`US: See US text proposal on Transparency`
<strong>[CH:</strong> 1. Each Party shall publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at the latest by the time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of general application which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agreement. International agreements pertaining to or affecting trade in services to which a Party is a signatory shall also be published.
2. Where publication as referred to in paragraph 1 is not practicable, such information shall be made otherwise publicly available.]
<center><strong>Article [...]: Disclosure of Confidential Information</strong></center>
Nothing in this Agreement shall require any Party to provide confidential information, the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or which would prejudice legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
<center><strong>[Article [...] Domestic Regulation]
[AU/CA/CH/CL/CO/CR/EU/HK/IS/IL/JP/KR/MX/NO/NZ/PA/PE/TR/TW/US/UY propose:</strong></center>
1. Parties recognize the right to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services within their territories in order to meet their <strong>[CR/LI/MX/TR propose:</strong> public] policy objectives.
[CH/HK/MX/TR propose: 2. AU/CA/CL/CO/CR/EU/JP/NO/PA/US oppose: Nothing in these
disciplines prevents Parties from exercising the right to introduce or maintain regulations in
order to ensure provision of universal service [HK propose:, in a manner consistent with their
obligations and commitments under this Agreement].]
`The group has agreed to move the provision above from the DR Annex to the core text, and will further discuss if it should appear as part of the preamble or as a provision.`
`Recognizing the right to regulate for the purpose of ensuring provision of universal service is subsumed under a Party's right to regulate, all parties except TR prefer to remove the last bracketed text of this Article.`
<center><em>Page 8</em></center>
<hr>
2. <strong>[US propose; AU/CH/HK/JP/KR/NO/NZ/PE/PK oppose; CA/CL/CO/CR/EU/IS/MX/PA/TR/TW/UY considering:</strong> [In sectors where specific commitments are undertaken,][Subject to any [terms, limitations,] conditions or qualifications set out in its schedule]] Each Party shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.]
`The group has agreed to move the provision above from the DR Annex to the core text.`
`The proponent will reflect further on its proposed bracketed text (in italics) in light of the hybrid
scheduling approach of this agreement.`
<strong>[AU/CA/CH/CR/CL/CO/EU/HK/IL/IS/JP/KR/LI/MX/NO/NZ/PA/PE/PK/TR/TW/US/UY propose:</strong>
3. Each Party shall maintain <strong>[AU/CA/CO/EU/JP/LI/MX/PE/TR/US oppose:</strong> or institute as soon as practicable] judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures which provide, at the request of an affected service supplier, for the prompt review of, and where justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade in services. Where such procedures are not independent of the agency entrusted with the administrative decision concerned, the Party shall ensure that the procedures in fact provide for an objective and impartial review.]
`EU comment: does not support placement of this provision in the core text part 1`
<center><strong>Article I-6: Recognition</strong></center>
1. For the purposes of the fulfillment, in whole or in part, of its standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certification of services suppliers, and subject to the requirements of Paragraph 3, a Party may recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certifications granted in a particular country. Such recognition, which may be achieved through harmonization or otherwise, may be based upon an agreement or arrangement with the country concerned or may be accorded autonomously.
2. A Party that is a party to an agreement or arrangement of the type referred to in Paragraph 1, whether existing or future, shall afford adequate opportunity for any other Party, upon request, to negotiate their accession to such an agreement or arrangement or to negotiate comparable ones with it. Where a Party accords recognition autonomously, it shall afford adequate opportunity for any other Party to demonstrate that education, experience, licenses, or certifications obtained or requirements met in that other Party’s territory should be recognized
<center><em>Page 9</em></center>
<hr>
3. A Party shall not accord recognition in a manner which would constitute a means of discrimination between countries in the application of its standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certification of services suppliers, or a disguised restriction on trade in services.
4. Each Party shall:
(a) within 12 months from the date on which the Agreement takes effect for it, inform the [Working Party on Professional Services] of its existing recognition measures and state whether such measures are based on agreements or arrangements of the type referred to in Paragraph 1;
(b) promptly inform the [Working Party on Professional Services] as far in advance as possible of the opening of negotiations on an agreement or arrangement of the type referred to in Paragraph 1 in order to provide adequate opportunity to any other Party to indicate their interest in participating in the negotiations before they enter a substantive
phase;
(c) promptly inform the [Working Party on Professional Services] when it adopts new recognition measures or significantly modifies existing ones and state whether the measures are based on an agreement or arrangement of the type referred to in Paragraph 1.
5. Wherever appropriate, recognition should be based on multilaterally agreed criteria. In appropriate cases, Parties shall work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations towards the establishment and adoption of common international standards and criteria for recognition and common international standards for the practice of relevant services trades and professions.
<center><strong>Article I-7: Payments and Transfers</strong></center>
1. Except under the circumstances envisaged in Article I-8, a Party shall not apply restrictions on
international transfers and payments for current transactions relating to its [specific commitments.
<center><em>Page 10</em></center>
<hr>
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of the members of the International Monetary Fund under the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, including the use of exchange actions which are in conformity with the Articles of Agreement, provided that a Party shall not impose restrictions on any capital transactions inconsistently with its [specific] commitments regarding such transactions, except under Article I-9 or at the request of the Fund.
<center><strong>Article I-8: Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments</strong></center>
1. In the event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or threat thereof, a Party may adopt or maintain restrictions on trade in services on which it has undertaken [specific] commitments, including on payments or transfers for transactions related to such commitments. It is recognized that particular pressures on the balance of payments of a Party in the process of economic development or economic transition may necessitate the use of
restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves adequate for the implementation of its program of economic development or economic transition.
2. The restrictions referred to in paragraph 1:
(a) shall not discriminate among Parties;
(b) shall be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund;
(c) shall avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial interests of any other Party;
(d) shall not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances described in paragraph 1;
(e) shall be temporary and be phased out progressively as the situation specified in paragraph 1 improves.
3. In determining the incidence of such restrictions, Parties may give priority to the supply of services which are more essential to their economic or development programs. However, such restrictions shall not be adopted or maintained for the purpose of protecting a particular service sector.
4. Any restrictions adopted or maintained under paragraph 1, or any changes therein, shall be promptly notified to [body defined by the Agreement]
<center><em>Page 11</em></center>
<hr>
5. (a) Parties applying the provisions of this Article shall consult promptly with the [body defined by the Agreement] on restrictions adopted under this Article.
(b) The [body defined by the Agreement] shall establish procedures (<em>See note 5<em>) for periodic consultations with the objective of enabling such recommendations to be made to the Party concerned as it may deem appropriate.
(c) Such consultations shall assess the balance-of-payment situation of the Party concerned and the restrictions adopted or maintained under this Article, taking into account, inter alia, such factors as:
(i) the nature and extent of the balance-of-payments and the external financial
difficulties;
(ii) the external economic and trading environment of the consulting Party;
(iii) alternative corrective measures which may be available.
(d) The consultations shall address the compliance of any restrictions with paragraph 2, in particular the progressive phaseout of restrictions in accordance with paragraph 2(e).
(e) In such consultations, all findings of statistical and other facts presented by the International Monetary Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balance of payments, shall be accepted and conclusions shall be based on the assessment by the Fund of the balance-of-payments and the external financial situation of the consulting Party.
6. If a Party which is not a member of the International Monetary Fund wishes to apply the provisions of this Article, the [body defined by the Agreement] shall establish a review procedure and any other procedures necessary.]
`AU: Paragraphs 4 to 6 subject to further discussion on institutional provisions.`
<center><strong>Article [...] Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers</strong></center>
1. Each Party shall ensure that any monopoly supplier of a service in its territory does not, in the supply of the monopoly service in the relevant market, act in a manner inconsistent with that Party's obligations under Article [...] (MFN) and [specific] commitments.
<hr>
<strong>Note 5</strong> It is understood that the procedures under paragraph 5 shall be the same as the GATT 1994 procedures
<center><em>Page 12</em></center>
<hr>
2. Where a Party's monopoly supplier competes, either directly or through an affiliated company, in the supply of a service outside the scope of its monopoly rights and which is subject to that Party's [specific] commitments, the Party shall ensure that such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent with such commitments.
3. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to cases of exclusive service suppliers, where a Party, formally or in effect, (a) authorizes or establishes a small number of service suppliers and
(b) substantially prevents competition among those suppliers in its territory.
<center><strong>Article I-9: General Exceptions</strong></center>
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; (<em>See note 6</em>)
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to:
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects of a default on services contracts;
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts;
(iii) safety;
(d) inconsistent with Article I-4 (National Treatment), provided that the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective (<em>See note 7</em>) imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of
<hr>
<strong>Note 6</strong> The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.
<strong>Note 7</strong> Measures that are aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes include measures taken by a Party under its taxation system which:
(i) apply to non-resident service suppliers in recognition of the fact that the tax obligation of non-residents is determined with respect to taxable items sourced or located in the Party’s territory; or
(ii) apply to non-residents in order to ensure the imposition or collection of taxes in the Party’s territory; or services or service suppliers of other Parties;
<center><em>Page 13</em></center>
<hr>
(e) inconsistent with Article [...], provided that the difference in treatment is the result of an
agreement on the avoidance of double taxation or provisions on the avoidance of double
taxation in any other international agreement or arrangement by which the Party is bound.
<center><strong>Article I-10: Security Exceptions</strong></center>
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any Party to furnish any information, the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any Party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests:
(i) relating to the supply of services as carried out directly or indirectly for the purpose of provisioning a military establishment;
(ii) relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or to prevent any Party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.
2. [The [body defined by the Agreement] shall be informed to the fullest extent possible of measures taken under paragraphs 1(b) and (c) and of their termination.]
<hr>
<em>(iii) apply to non-residents or residents in order to prevent the avoidance or evasion of taxes, including compliance measures; or
(iv) apply to consumers of services supplied in or from the territory of another Party in order to ensure the imposition or collection of taxes on such consumers derived from sources in the Party's territory; or
(v) distinguish service suppliers subject to tax on worldwide taxable items from other service suppliers, in
recognition of the difference in the nature of the tax base between them; or
(vi) determine, allocate or apportion income, profit, gain, loss, deduction or credit of resident persons or branches, or between related persons or branches of the same person, in order to safeguard the Party's tax base.
Tax terms or concepts in paragraph (d) of Article [...] (General Exceptions) and in this footnote are determined
according to tax definitions and concepts, or equivalent or similar definitions and concepts, under the domestic law of the Party taking the measure</em>
<center><em>Page 14</em></center>
<hr>
<center><strong>[Article [..]: Annexes</strong></center>
<center>The Annexes to this Agreement are an integral part of this Agreement].</center>
`Might need to be reviewed depending on outcome of discussion on new and enhanced disciplines and to ensure Schedules and other relevant attachments are integral part of the Agreement.`
<center><strong>[Article [...] Denial of benefits</strong></center>
A Party may deny the benefits of this Agreement:
(a) to the supply of a service, if it establishes that the service is supplied from or in the territory of a non-Party or of a Party to which the denying Party does not apply the WTO Agreement;
(b) in the case of the supply of a maritime transport service, if it establishes that the service is supplied:
(i) by a vessel registered under the laws of a non-Party or of a Party to which the denying Party does not apply the WTO Agreement, and
(ii) by a person which operates and/or uses the vessel in whole or in part but which is of a non-Party or of a Party to which the denying Party does not apply the WTO Agreement;
(c) to a service supplier that is a juridical person, if it establishes that it is not a service supplier of another Party, or that it is a service supplier of a Party to which the denying Party does not apply the WTO Agreement.]
<center><strong>[GATS Article XIII: Government Procurement</strong></center>
Articles II, XVI and XVII [Articles MFN, MA and NT] shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for governmental purposes and not a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial sale.]
<center><strong>[Placeholder for subsidies]</strong></center>
<center><em>Page 15</em></center>
<hr>
<center><strong>Part II – Scheduling Commitments</strong></center>
Each Party shall adopt a schedule in accordance with the provisions set out in this Part.
<center><strong>Article II-1: Scheduling of Market Access Commitments</strong></center>
In scheduling commitments pursuant to Article I-3 (Market Access), each Party shall set out in Section B of Part I and in Part II of its Schedule the [specific] commitments it undertakes, and any terms, limitations and conditions with respect to sectors where such commitments are undertaken.
<center><strong>Article II-2: Scheduling of National Treatment Commitments</strong></center>
1. In scheduling commitments pursuant to Article I-4 (National Treatment), each Party shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Party, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers, subject to any conditions and qualifications that the Party shall set out in its Schedule in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4.
2. The conditions and qualifications on national treatment set out in Section B of Part I or Part II of each Party’s Schedule shall be limited to measures that a Party maintains on the date this Agreement takes effect, or the continuation or prompt renewal of any such measures.
3. If a Party amends a measure referred to in paragraph 2 in a way that reduces or eliminates the inconsistency of that measure with the treatment provided for in Article I-4 (National Treatment), as it existed immediately before the amendment, a Party may not subsequently amend that measure in a way that increases the inconsistency with the treatment provided for in
<center><strong>Article I-4 (National Treatment).</strong></center>
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 and Article I-4 (National Treatment) do not apply to any measure that a Party adopts or maintains with respect to sectors, sub-sectors, or activities as set out in Section A of Part I of each Party’s Schedule.
`CH: Switzerland will continue its consultations regarding these provisions and their implications and operationalization under its domestic law.`
`EU: Depending on outcomes of the discussion on annex on mode 4 a provision on Scheduling of Entry and Temporary Stay of Natural Persons could be introduced here.`
<center><em>Page 16</em></center>
<hr>
<center><strong>[Article II-3 Scheduling of Measures Inconsistent with both Market Access and National Treatment</strong></center>
<strong>[AU/CA/CO/EU/JP/NZ/US propose:</strong> Any measure required to be set out in a Party’s Schedule in accordance with both Article II-1 (Scheduling of Market Access Commitments) and Article II-2 (Scheduling of National Treatment Commitments) shall be included] in both the [NZ oppose: column] <strong>[NZ propose:</strong> part] of the Schedule that relates to Article I-3 (Market Access) and the [<strong>NZ oppose:</strong> column] <strong>[NZ propose:</strong> part] of the Schedule that relates to Article 1-4 (National Treatment).]
<center><strong>[Article II-4: Scheduling Additional Commitments]</strong></center>
<center><strong>[Under Discussion]</strong></center>
`<strong>EU:</strong> Further horizontal commitments or standards could be introduced here.`
<strong>Part III – New and Enhanced Disciplines
[...]
[US considering: Article [ ] Treaty of Waitangi</strong>
1. Provided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against persons of the other Parties or as a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in [Part III of] this Agreement shall preclude the adoption by New Zealand of measures it deems necessary to accord more favorable treatment to Maori in respect of matters covered by [Part III of] this Agreement including in fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.
2. The Parties agree that the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, including as to the nature of the rights and obligations arising under it, shall not be subject to the dispute settlement provisions of this Agreement. [Chapter [ ] (Dispute Settlement)] shall otherwise apply to this Article. An [arbitral tribunal] established under [Article [ ] (Establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal)] may be requested by a Party to determine only whether any measure (referred to in Paragraph 1) is inconsistent with its rights under this Agreement.
<center><em>Page 17</em></center>
<hr>
<strong>Part IV – Institutional Provisions</strong>
<center><strong>Section 1: Resolution of disputes
[...]
Section 2: Future participation to this Agreement
[...]
Section 3: Multi-Lateralization
[...]
Section 4: Institutional provisions
[including: review/modification of schedules...]
</strong></center>
`TW: With respect to Australia’s proposal on Article I-2 (p), we propose an alternative here to deal with all the terms not defined by the TiSA, in the case that the TiSA Parties deem it necessary and appropriate to harmonize the WTO and the TiSA interpretations.`
<center><strong>[TW propose: Article IV-x: Interpretations</strong></center>
Unless the context otherwise requires, any terms used but not defined in this Agreement shall have the
meaning given to such terms in the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to
it, and as informed by the WTO jurisprudence mutatis mutandis.]
<hr>
<div class="pull-right">
<img src="https://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png">
</div>
<div class="pull-left">
<center><h3>Notes from @ausbitbank</h3></center>
Congrats on making it this far - I know, its a long heavy read - its a draft contract afterall !
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</div># ❯Comments from @ausbitbank This is a customised blockchain archive of tweets from the official wikileaks twitter account for the past *9 days*. Effort has been made to minimize changes to the *meaning of the text*, whilst reformatting it nicely, minimizing redundant information and adding illustrations and relevant videos. **As always** - *all rewards earned by @steemleak will be donated to wikileaks*. We've donated **0.7649BTC so far!** . If people like what I'm doing here, please support the project with your votes and comments and consider following <a href="https://steemit.com/@ausbitbank">my personal profile</a> , and my <a href="https://steemit.com/@krystle">partner @krystle</a> too! <center><img src="http://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png"></center> # 🌏 Wikileaks Wrap for September 1-9th 🌏 ## 09/09/16 **Snowden the movie premiers tonight.** <a href="https://t.co/CRcZhtRSLQ">So how did he escape in the end</a>? ❯ <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/assange-how-guardian-milked-edward-snowdens-story-323480">Read Julian Assange's scathing review of the book</a> ❯ <a href="https://www.couragefound.org">More at couragefound.org</a> *Why is <a href="https://twitter.com/SenSanders">@SenSanders</a> still silent about TPP's big brother TiSA which will affect 80% of the US economy?* ❯ See more at <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/">WikiLeaks.org/tisa</a> <center><a href="https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/14039#efmAGDAG2"><img src="http://imgur.com/VmFqvWA.jpg"><br />❯ *Emails show Huma Abedin is in charge of Hillary Clinton's earpiece*</a></center> ❯**LIVE:** *<a href="https://twitter.com/KimDotCom">@KimDotcom</a> vs US extradition hearing* : <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H_WtX8hE144"> Live</a> , <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCw7XhgJhQDHkVrJjiw4CONg">Previous days</a> <center>**New York Times headline** "<a href="https://archive.is/nG6lS#selection-2997.1-3017.102">What Is Aleppo?’ Gary Johnson Asks, in an Interview Stumble</a>" but …<br /><img src="http://imgur.com/J8dvWGC.png"></center> *Why is <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump">@realDonaldTrump</a> silent about TPP's big brother TiSA which <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/06/10/revealed-the-secret-immigration-chapter-in-obamas-trade-agreement/">fast-tracks migration for corporate slaves</a>?* **Clinton lied to FBI, smashed phones, deleted emails**. So who was charged with obstruction? *This journalist's mother* ❯ **Read** <a href="https://wikileaks.org/Assange-statement-on-the.html">Assange: "The son of a bitch is me" - statement on the sentencing hearing of US journalist Barrett Brown</a> ❯Wikileaks' Sarah Harrison on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XX28c-k9Ctg">Edward Snowden and Julian Assange</a> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XX28c-k9Ctg ## 07/09/2016 **WikiLeaks' 10 year anniversary** of the registration of <a href="https://wikileaks.org">WikiLeaks.org</a> runs Oct 4 to Dec 28 (1st publication) **Sigurdur Thordarson**, fd Wikileaks-medarbetare: *[Translated]* **Sigurdur Thordarson**, former Wikileaks employee: >”FBI ville att jag skulle ha en dold mikrofon” > *[Translated]* "The FBI wanted me to have a hidden microphone" ❯ *Swedish speakers can watch @granskning's report live here:* <a href="http://www.svtplay.se/video/10194203/uppdrag-granskning/uppdrag-granskning-sasong-16-avsnitt-2">svtplay.se/video/10194203/..</a> **Live:** Uppdrag granskning om <a href="http://www.svt.se/tv-tabla/">Assangefallet, WikiLeaks, Marianne Ny och livet på ambassaden</a> *[Translated]* **Live:** Mandate Review on <a href="http://www.svt.se/tv-tabla/">Assangefallet, WikiLeaks, Marianne Ny and life at the embassy</a> Amerikanska dokument som Uppdrag granskning tagit del av visar att Assange har skäl för sin rädsla *[Translated badly]* US documents Mission granskning aware of shows that Assange has reason to fear ❯ <a href="http://svt.se/ug/julian-assange-riskerar-utlamning-till-usa">View article at svt.se/ug...</a> **How Hong Kong refugees & WikiLeaks saved Snowden while WaPo, Guardian, etc ran away** ❯ <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/features/how-edward-snowden-escaped-hong-kong">How Edward Snowden Escaped Hong Kong (nationalpost.com) **Assange:** <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/assange-how-guardian-milked-edward-snowdens-story-323480"> How 'The Guardian' Milked Edward Snowden's Story</a> (newsweek.com) ❯ <a href="https://wikileaks.org/Statement-by-Sarah-Harrison.html">Statement by Sarah Harrison</a> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/zaMOUAv.jpg"><br />**Retweeted <a href="https://twitter.com/AlanJonesPA">@AlanJonesPA**<br />Julian Assange says Sweden prosecutor press conf today appears a **"highly inappropriate attempt"** to place pressure on the courts</center> <center>Hillary Clinton has surrounded herself with (neo) "conservative" Iraq war hawks from Kissinger to Kagan.<br /> Is she the:<br /><img src="http://imgur.com/ih4XdlK.png"></center> <center><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U4Cs5TEjxtk"><img src="http://img.youtube.com/vi/U4Cs5TEjxtk/0.jpg"><br />Amazing insight into the culture Hillary Clinton left at the State Department</a><br />(youtube) ❯ Contrast Swedish press conference timeline with <a href="https://justice4assange.com/timeline.html">justice4assange.com/timeline.html</a> and <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/80912442/Agreed-Facts-Assange-Case">justice and the UK Supreme Court's timeline (scribd.com)</a> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/rCuwx2k.jpg"><br />"Assange can't be forced to answer Q's by Swedish prosecutors" <a href="https://twitter.com/MadsAndenas">@MadsAndenas</a> tells <a href="https://twitter.com/AuskarSurbakti">@AuskarSurbakti</a> </center> ### **WikiLeaks:** *The truth is out there - feat. Hillary Clinton vs Alex Jones* **[RAP NEWS 6]** https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hl4NlA97GeQ ❯ **FBI let Clinton destroy phones, records** but this <a href="https://wikileaks.org/Assange-statement-on-the.html">journalist's mother was charged for moving his notes</a> to the kitchen ❯ **Assange:** "Prosecutor's press conference is an inappropriate attempt to influence the Court of Appeal whose judgement is due in 2 days time." ❯ **Julian Assange:** Hillary Clinton is lying about <a href="https://amp.twimg.com/amplify-web-player/prod/source.html?vmap_url=https%3A%2F%2Famp.twimg.com%2Fprod%2Fmultibr_v_1%2Fvmap%2F2016%2F09%2F07%2F10%2F773463354761416704%2Fb09ac20d-e3ae-4a1a-b7d7-7cca656646a1.vmap&duration=46.741&image_src=https%3A%2F%2Fpbs.twimg.com%2Famplify_img%2F773463960624373760%2F9FjB7GLW%3Fformat%3Djpg%26name%3D640x360&content_id=773463354761416704&page=amplify_card">not knowing (C) classified email markings</a> ❯**Assange prosecutor** <a href="https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=6511625">calls press conf to pre-empt tonight's state TV revelations</a> ## 06/09/2016 ❯**Assange** on <a href="https://video.foxnews.com/v/5114956463001/assange-on-the-dangers-of-a-hillary-clinton-presidency/">how Hillary Clinton misled the FBI about her knowledge of the "C" classification marking</a> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/j7xMeb0.png"><br />**Who**'s giving undisclosed millions <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-foundation-idUSKCN118248?feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews">to the Clinton Foundation via its Sweden affiliate</a>?<br />(reuters.com)</center> <center><a href="https://sofrep.com/63318/5-key-insights-syrian-conflict-wikileaks-dump/"><img src="http://imgur.com/OykSUsN.jpg"></a><br />**5-key insights** on the Syrian conflict <a href="https://sofrep.com/63318/5-key-insights-syrian-conflict-wikileaks-dump/">via Hillary Clinton’s emails and WikiLeaks</a><br /> (sofrep.com)</center> <center><img src="http://imgur.com/e1jpPHA.jpg"><br />Clinton saying she doesn't know what "C" means in a classified document is as credible as a claim she doesn't know what "C" means in HRC</center> <center><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOkLVHE66vU"><img src="http://imgur.com/vJdP64Y.jpg"></a><br />**Julian Assange** on <a href="https://wikileaks.org/google-is-not-what-it-seems/">Google's political ties to Hillary Clinton </a> (wikileaks.org) (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOkLVHE66vU">youtube</a>) **Buried in FBI report** is revelation that *all Clinton's emails* were being iillicitly copied *over the internet* into her *contractor's cloud*. ❯**Retweeted <a href="https://twitter.com/botherder">@botherder</a>** RCS Lab had a long standing relationship <a href="https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/?q=rcslab&mfrom=&mto=&title=¬itle=&date=&nofrom=¬o=&count=50&sort=0#searchresult">with HackingTeam partnering on deals like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and more</a> (wikileaks search) ## 05/09/2016 <center><a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/"><img src="http://imgur.com/0we9l1Q.png"><br />Clinton & Trump maintain their silence on TPP's big brother TiSA which covers 52 countries</a><br />(<a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/ ">wikileaks.org/tisa</a>)</center> ❯**TIME** releases previously withheld (for reasons unstated) <a href="http://content.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,694556663001_2034157,00.html ">interview with Assange shortly before his arrest in 2010</a> (time.com) <center><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wtSWh14MPGU"><img src="http://imgur.com/lifTwWk.jpg"><br />Assange 6-years detained after Clinton cables; Sweden sends $26M to ClintonFountation</a><br />(youtube.com)</center> <center><a href="http://theindicter.com/paid-agent-of-swedish-security-services-implicated-in-second-disinformation-campaign-against-assange/"><img src="http://imgur.com/ZPdLlRP.jpg"><br />Paid agent of Swedish intelligence took over 'progressive' journalism outfit & used it to attack Assange</a><br />(theindicter.com)</center> <center><a href="https://professorsblogg.com/2016/08/24/over-60-professors-four-nobel-prize-winners-demand-sweden-to-respect-the-un-ruling-on-assanges-freedom/"><img src="http://imgur.com/gc4uzwN.jpg"><br />Over 60 professors, four Nobel Prize winners, demand Sweden to respect the UN ruling on Assange’s freedom</a></center> **UG: Fallet Assange** - <a href="https://www.facebook.com/granskning/videos/10154578371174883/">i veckans Uppdrag granskning</a> *[Translated]* **UG: The Assange case** <a href="https://www.facebook.com/granskning/videos/10154578371174883/">in this week's Assignment Review</a> <center><a href="http://www.thelocal.se/20120921/43370"><img src="http://imgur.com/QC4wOhv.jpg"><br />Prosecutors keep Assange case 6 years while rapidly drop huge arms-deal case</a><br />(thelocal.se)</center> <center><a href="https://medium.com/@PatrickWStanley/anton-vaino-vayno-vladimir-putins-newly-appointed-chief-of-staff-wrote-a-pretty-far-out-585e90cfaec4#.bpkk4z18n"><img src="http://imgur.com/vb0Pz8t.jpg"></a><br />Inside the head of <a href="https://medium.com/@PatrickWStanley/anton-vaino-vayno-vladimir-putins-newly-appointed-chief-of-staff-wrote-a-pretty-far-out-585e90cfaec4#.bpkk4z18n">Anton Vaino (Vayno), Vladimir Putin’s newly appointed Chief of Staff</a><br />(medium.com)</center> ## 03/09/16 <center><a href="https://archive.is/Qnihw#selection-1963.0-1963.141"><img src="http://imgur.com/DFS9hWJ.png"></a><br />**Did the NYT call itself a stooge of the Kremlin** in its <a href="https://archive.is/Qnihw#selection-1963.0-1963.141">front page WikiLeaks hit piece</a>?<br />(archive.is)</center> **Sean Wilentz** <a href="https://www.wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/1491#efmAHWAHt">also wrote the first big pro-NSA smear</a> (wikileaks.org) against <a href="https://twitter.com/snowden">@Snowden</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/GGReenwald">@GGReenwald</a> & Assange in New Republic https://twitter.com ❯**Clinton email** shows New Yorker <a href="https://www.wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/1491#efmAHWAHt ">published article secretly written with chief Clinton operative Syd Bleumenthal</a> <center><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k4aIIpCDsLU"><img src="http://imgur.com/IVse71U.jpg"><br />Hillary Clinton threatens war with Russia <br />(should WikiLeaks keep publishing true information about her campaign)</a><br />(youtube) ## 02/09/2016 **Note on Clinton FBI report:** "Our records show that Clinton sent & received thousands of cables with "(C)" paragraph classification markings." **Why do significant Hillary Clinton FOIA releases always happen on Friday afternoon, or before a national holiday?** **NEW:** Hillary Clinton FBI interview & investigation summaries PDF: <a href="https://vault.fbi.gov/hillary-r.-clinton/hillary-r.-clinton-part-01-of-02/at_download/file">1 … <a href="https://vault.fbi.gov/hillary-r.-clinton/hillary-r.-clinton-part-02-of-02/at_download/file">2</a> **New York Timesfront page WikiLeaks conspiracy theory** was penned by <a href="http://wsws.org/en/articles/2016/09/02/wiki-s02.html">a governor of the Ditchley Foundation</a> Support Snowden, Manning, Hammond, DeHart, Brown, and Love. <a href="https://fundrazr.com/campaigns/d19Bc3">**Support Courage**</a> ## 01/09/2016 <center><a href="http://www.mintpressnews.com/new-dnc-chair-donna-brazile-calls-wikileaks-assange-criminal-dnc-leak/220001/"><img src="http://imgur.com/iiGEIFp.jpg"></a><br />**RT <a href="https://twitter.com/mintpressnews">@MintPressNews</a>** New DNC Chair <a href="https://twitter.com/DonnaBrazile">@DonnaBrazile</a> Calls <a href="http://www.mintpressnews.com/new-dnc-chair-donna-brazile-calls-wikileaks-assange-criminal-dnc-leak/220001/">WikiLeaks' Assange A Criminal Over DNCLeak</a> <br />(mintpressnews.com)</center> **WikiLeaks under cover** in the New York Times reveals nature of relationship with US presidency. Look closely at photo <br />(*Youtube video removed by copyright claim by Journeyman Pictures*) <center><a href=" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9H1zLZ-xS0w "><img src="http://img.youtube.com/vi/9H1zLZ-xS0w/0.jpg"><br />**Video:** Aaron Swartz on WikiLeaks vs. the New York Times</a></center> <center><a href="http://youtube.com/watch?v=b_npSb-tyGQ"><img src="http://img.youtube.com/vi/b_npSb-tyGQ/0.jpg"><br />**TYT:** New York Times "sick"</a><br />(more at <a href="http://nytexaminer.com">nytexaminer.com</a>)</center> **Gosztola:** <a href="https://shadowproof.com/2016/09/01/clinton-us-government-benefit-new-york-times-attacks-wikileaks/">How Clinton And US Government Benefit When New York Times Attacks WikiLeaks</a> (shadowproof.com) <center><img src="http://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png"><br />**<a href="https://www.steemleak.com">@steemleak - Support wikileaks with your votes!**<br /></center>
<center>***This is a notice from the <a href="https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/771329205594447872">wikileaks twitter feed</a>, full original text is hosted <a href="http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1sp2hsr">at twitlonger</a>***<br />Article has been reformatted for readability by @ausbitbank</center> ## Response to New York Times article published Thursday <center> 🐿 ***<a href="http://archive.is/my52v">How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets</a>*** 🐿</center> ***The only hard news in the article is that*** >"American officials say Mr. Assange and WikiLeaks **probably have no direct ties** to Russian intelligence services." * WikiLeaks has published more than **650,000 documents** about Russia & president Putin, **most of which are critical**. <center> 🐿 See <a href="https://search.wikileaks.org/">search.wikileaks.org</a> 🐿</center> * **It is false that Russia issued a visa for Julian Assange**. * **It is false that the book 'The WikiLeaks Files' (which is about US diplomacy), contains no criticism of Russia.** It contain numerous critical references to Russia including a whole chapter on US diplomatic relations with Russia with numerous references to Russian corruption. * **It is false that Mr. Assange 'muse[d] to associates about relocating' to Russia.** He openly joked in a press conference about ***how absurd it would be*** if a western press freedom activist would be forced to seek asylum in Cuba. * **It is false that WikiLeaks or Mr. Assange have not "publicly criticized' human rights abuses by Mr. Assad and the Russian forces fighting there."** WikiLeaks does not comment on world events unless the events relate to its publications, to its organization or to its alleged sources. But, for example, WikiLeaks has backed Amnesty's criticism of Russian civilian kills in their bombing runs in response to Russian partisans attacking it, saying Amnesty's numerical analysis appears to hold. * **It is misleading to impy that WikiLeaks simply Tweeted once about the imprisonment of the Russian musical group Pussy Riot**. Infact, Mr. Assange has met multiple times with various members of Pussy Riot and they have joined the Courage Foundation, which he co-founded, and which protects journalistic sources. <center>🐿 See article "<a href="http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/22662/1/pussy-riot-joins-julian-assange-whistleblower-foundation">Pussy Riot joins Julian Assange whistleblower foundation</a>" 🐿</center> * **It is false that WikiLeaks has not produced critical material on the Assad government.** WikiLeaks has published **2.3 million documents** from the Assad government, a Russian ally, including the head of state, Bashar al Assad's personal emails. WikiLeaks has also published on the Syrian government spying on Syrian activists using 'bluecoat' and documented many imports used by the Syrian security state in violation of the sanctions regime. <center> 🐿 See <a href="https://wikileaks.org/syria-files/">wikileaks.org/syria-files</a> and this <a href="https://twitter.com/search?f=tweets&amp;vertical=default&amp;q=syria%20%20from%3Awikileaks%20since%3A2012-01-01%20until%3A2012-12-31&amp;src=typd">twitter archive</a> 🐿</center> <center> ***The conspiracy theory the article attempts to impute about the timing of WikiLeaks' publications is false and is not journalism.***</center> Take the leading example in the article, the total censorship of the Kurdish broadcaster RoJ TV. Mr. Assange drawing attention to this outrage coincides with RoJ's attempts to get publicity for their court appeal (the star exhibit of which is a WikiLeaks publication). Later when NATO head Rassmusen appeared in the news this provided a hook for drawing attention to WikiLeaks' archives and how they document the dirty deals behind the destruction of RoJ TV. <center>🐿 See "<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YL0zrkygkn4">Assange ROJ TV Plot</a>" on youtube 🐿</center> Similarly in other cases WikiLeaks has responded to news hooks -- **as all news outlets do**, to draw attention to its archives or to support its anti-censorship or source protection mission. **Again, any other other suggestion is false**. WikiLeaks is not aware of any assertion by the US government that the DNC emails published by WikiLeaks were 'stolen by Russian intelligence'. In fact, the head of US intelligence, James Clapper, has stated that **the US government has not been able to make an attribution**. The various hacks of the DNC over several years are **not the same matter** as WikiLeaks publication of leaked emails and **it is misleading to suggest otherwise**. **It is false that the UN decision on Assange is "non-binding"**. The UN has explicitly stated that it is "legally binding". **It is false that it has been rejected by the British courts**. Its binding nature is now being considered by the Swedish Court of Appeal. ## The UN's statement in response to press errors: **NOTE TO EDITORS:** >The Opinions of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention are legally-binding to the extent that they are based on binding international human rights law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The WGAD has a mandate to investigate allegations of individuals being deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary way or inconsistently with international human rights standards, and to recommend remedies such as release from detention and compensation, when appropriate. The binding nature of its opinions derives from the collaboration by States in the procedure, the adversarial nature of is findings and also by the authority given to the WGAD by the UN Human Rights Council. The Opinions of the WGAD are also considered as authoritative by prominent international and regional judicial institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights." <center>🐿 View <a href="http://ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17013&amp;LangID=E">Julian Assange arbitrarily detained by Sweden and the UK, UN expert panel finds</a> at ohchr.org 🐿</center> The New York Times Editorial Board **has endorsed Hillary Clinton**, however this is ***not disclosed*** in the article. The lead author, Jo Becker last retweeted Hillary Clinton (a smiling and dancing animated Hillary Clinton), on March 3rd. The other author, Eric Schmitt, has previously written in the New York Times, other robust investigative reports, for example, that Mr. Assange is a 'bag lady' with 'filthy socks' who 'smells'. He was made Pentagon Correspondent in 1990. <center> <a href="https://steemit.com/@steemleak"><img src="http://imgur.com/JQG0y20.png"></a></center> <center><strong><a href="/@steemleak">@steemleak</a> donates all rewards received to wikileaks</strong> Support wikileaks with your vote!<br><a href="https://www.steemleak.com" rel="noopener">steemleak.com</a></center>