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<p>&nbsp;Today marks the 65th anniversary that the west carried out a coup in &nbsp;Iran that destabilized the county by overthrowing the country’s &nbsp;democratically elected leader,&nbsp;Mohammad Mossadegh, and installed a CIA &nbsp;groomed dictator. What was once considered a conspiracy theory is now a fact as the &nbsp;government has since admitted to carrying out Operation Ajax that was &nbsp;planned by the CIA in conjunction with MI6 in the UK to exploit the &nbsp;Iranian people and steal their oil on behalf of the&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-company">Anglo-Iranian Oil Company&nbsp;</a>(AIOC) &nbsp;– the British state-owned oil company established in 1908 with this &nbsp;objective in mind and the forerunner of today’s global oil conglomerate &nbsp;BP.&nbsp;</p>
<p>As TFTP <a href="https://thefreethoughtproject.com/us-govt-planned-1953-iranian-coup-mossadeq/">reported last year,</a> &nbsp;the State Department released a trove of documents that give insight &nbsp;into the CIA’s role in the 1953 coup d’état that led to the overthrow of &nbsp;Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. The newly declassified documents, titled “<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran">Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954</a>,” &nbsp;provide a notable difference from the State Department’s 1989 version &nbsp;of the coup, which left out any involvement from American and British &nbsp;intelligence.&nbsp;</p>
<p>A memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to President Eisenhower, dated <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d169">March 1, 1953</a>, serves as a reminder that internally, <em>“the elimination of Mossadeq&nbsp;by assassination or otherwise,</em>” was used as a method in repairing ties with Iran, restoring oil negotiations, and stopping a <em>“Communist takeover.”</em>&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote><em>“Ever since the assassination of General&nbsp;Razmara&nbsp;in &nbsp;March 1951, and the subsequent impasse and diplomatic break with Britain &nbsp;over the oil negotiations, the Iranian situation has been slowly &nbsp;disintegrating. The result has been a steady decrease in the power and &nbsp;influence of the Western democracies and </em><em><strong>the building up of a situation where a Communist takeover is becoming more and more of a possibility.</strong></em><em> However, even the present crisis is likely to be unsatisfactorily compromised without a Communist Tudeh victory. </em><em><strong>Of course, the elimination of&nbsp;Mossadeq&nbsp;by assassination or otherwise might precipitate decisive events</strong></em><em> except in the unlikely alternative that the Shah should regain courage and decisiveness.”</em></blockquote>
<p>Another memorandum from the CIA, dated <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d170">March 3, 1953</a>, detailed the <em>“Capabilities of CIA clandestine services in Iran,”</em> which could be used to <em>“prevent the assumption of power by Tudeh,”</em> Iran’s Communist party. The list included mass propaganda means; personal denunciations and &nbsp;rumor spreading; street riots, demonstrations, and mobs; and providing &nbsp;assistance in Iran <em>“After Tudeh Take-Over.”</em>&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote><em>“</em><em><strong>Mass propaganda means</strong></em><em> (press, &nbsp;etc.):&nbsp;CIA&nbsp;controls a network with numerous press, political, and &nbsp;clerical contacts which has proven itself capable of disseminating &nbsp;large-scale anti-Tudeh propaganda.”</em></blockquote>
<p>While the conversations initially supported Mossadeq as Iran’s prime &nbsp;minister, the tone soon changed, and a memorandum from the CIA, dated <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d179">March 18, 1953</a>, noted that top State Department officials had begun discussing <em>“The general subject of Mossadeq’s continuance in office.”</em>&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote><em>“Gist of discussion was to effect that situation has &nbsp;materially altered since December. While there is no obvious choice in &nbsp;sight to replace Mossadeq it is felt that any assets which could be &nbsp;rallied to support a replacement should, if at all possible, he &nbsp;preserved for at least a few months more until the course of events may &nbsp;be clarified.”</em></blockquote>
<p>In addition to its array of “services” listed above, that were used &nbsp;to control the situation in Iran, the CIA also advised the soon-to-be &nbsp;leaders. In a memorandum, dated <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d260">August 14, 1953</a>, the CIA detailed a meeting with Fazlollah Zahedi, the Iranian general who would become Mossadeq’s replacement.&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote><em>“Earlier meeting with Zahedi showed him firm of &nbsp;purpose but inhabiting dream world so far as his subsequent program &nbsp;concerned. Spoke of free medical care for the third class citizens, &nbsp;mechanizing agriculture and growing vast crops of cotton on Moghan &nbsp;Steppes, equalizing wealth by income taxes, etc. </em><em><strong>Time [is] not &nbsp;right for us to argue issue but we [are] warning strongly against making &nbsp;impossible promises in early speeches. It [is] clear Zahedi will need &nbsp;firm, realistic guidance</strong></em><em>.”</em></blockquote>
<p>In a memorandum, dated <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d274">August 17, 1953</a>, &nbsp;the CIA revealed its attempts to control public opinion after the coup, &nbsp;by telling Kermit Roosevelt, the director of the operation, that the &nbsp;State advised its “press relations people” to stay away from terms such &nbsp;as “coup d’état” and “plot,” while working to convince the public that &nbsp;if there was a coup, it was on behalf of Mossadeq—not Zahedi. Two days &nbsp;later, they carried it out.&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote><em><strong>“Roosevelt&nbsp;should &nbsp;be advised that State has passed the word to&nbsp;VOA&nbsp;and instructed its own &nbsp;press relations people to avoid any such terminology as ‘coup d’état,’ &nbsp;‘plot,’ etc., and that while playing the story ‘straight’ they should &nbsp;play up the fact that there is another version of the story supported by &nbsp;both&nbsp;Zahedi&nbsp;and now the Shah which indicates that if there was any coup &nbsp;d’état it was that of Mossadegh and not of Zahedi.”</strong></em></blockquote>
<p>The archive includes nearly 1,000 pages of documents, and while it is &nbsp;significant in framing the stage for today’s relations between the &nbsp;United States and Iran, it also important based on the fact that it is &nbsp;information the U.S. has attempted to bury.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The idea that the CIA would meddle in a sovereign nation, work to &nbsp;overthrow its government, and then influence public perception, is &nbsp;nothing new in 2018. And yet, despite years of revelations, &nbsp;regime-change wars and failed proxy governments, there is still a &nbsp;perception among the American people that the government interfering &nbsp;with countries that have done nothing to the U.S., all in the name of &nbsp;“freedom.”&nbsp;</p>