My guess is that it will address some, but not all of Snowden's points.  Basically, the authors break it into a 2x2 matrix with "bulk" and "targeted" attacks on one axis and "global" and "local" sources on the other.  They say that their protocol is designed to protect against bulk attacks with local and global sources as well as providing limited protection against targeted local attacks, but doesn't do much to protect a global targeted attack by a nation-state or other powerful actor.   Here are some relevant excerpts:

<blockquote>

Carriers and governments are the most common global bulk attackers. Such bulk surveillance is commonplace in cellular networks, and has been at the center of recent lawsuits and privacy concerns. Attacks that employ IMSI catchers or passively listen to broadcasts using software-defined radios are considered local-bulk. Here, an IMSI catcher is only able to monitor phones that connect directly to it, so its visibility is limited to its radio range. Similarly, SDR-based passive snooping (as in the example in §3) is only able to monitor nearby base stations and will miss portions of the network. We design PGPP with a primary focus on thwarting bulk attacks by nullifying the value of IMSIs (§5.1).

</blockquote>

and

<blockquote>

Global-targeted attacks represent a very powerful attacker who can actively probe a victim while having global visibility of the network. We envision defenses against such attacks would require fundamental changes to to communication models. PGPP does not mitigate global-targeted attacks as we focus on immediately deployable solutions; we leave this to future work.

</blockquote>